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THE LIGHTS ARE ON: SHINING A SPOTLIGHT ON THE 
RETAIL ENERGY MARKET REVEALS THE NEED FOR 
ENHANCED CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 
Carrie Scrufari* 
“All life is an experiment” 
~ Ralph Waldo Emerson 
“If we did all the things we are capable of, we would 
literally astound ourselves.” 
~ Thomas Edison1 
ABSTRACT 
In the 1990s, New York embarked on an experiment of epic 
proportions when it sought to restructure what had become a regulated 
monopoly of an industry: its energy sector. Like many other states, 
New York sought to increase competition within the energy sector to 
drive down prices for consumers and expand the range of renewable 
energy options that were available. After waiting nearly three decades, 
New York appears poised to finally assess the efficacy of this great 
experiment. Years of escalating consumer complaints, Attorney 
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 1. Quoted in Energy to Lead: 2015 New York State Energy Plan, New York 
State Energy Planning Board, Vol 1, at 8, file:///Users/carriescrufari/Downloads/
2015-state-energy-plan.pdf. 
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General investigations, and analysis by the Department of Public 
Service Staff have revealed that residential consumers are not faring 
as well as the State had hoped. Since 2014, New Yorkers electing to 
receive energy commodity service from companies competing with the 
default utilities were overcharged to the tune of one billion dollars. In 
households where families struggle to make ends meet and often must 
choose between putting dinner on the table or keeping the heat on, any 
overcharge on an energy bill creates a public health hazard. Having 
faced its third polar vortex in five years, more New York families than 
ever before confront the Hobson’s choice of paying for food or paying 
for energy at a time when costs have never been higher. This article 
argues for the necessity of implementing additional consumer 
protection measures in the retail access energy market. 
INTRODUCTION 
What are society’s most important needs? What is essential to ensure 
survival? Physiologically, humans require clean air, water, and food, 
but meeting these basic needs often requires another resource. Upon 
waking, before most people take a sip of water or a bite of breakfast, 
they do something else just as vital to their survival. If they are lucky, 
most people take one action before any other – turning on a light 
switch. Before consuming food or drink, people consume another vital 
resource equally necessary to health and wellbeing: energy. Indeed, 
energy is often a prerequisite to fulfilling other basic needs. Drinking 
water and eating breakfast usually require turning on a tap, opening a 
refrigerator, or lighting a stove. In modern society, most people rely 
on energy to access the jobs that allow them to pay for food and drink, 
whether it be by car, bus, or train. Even those who walk or bike to their 
place of employment rely on energy the moment they turn on an office 
light, fire up a computer, or make a phone call – all tasks likely 
necessary to earning the paychecks that allow for continued survival. 
Energy becomes even more immediate to survival for humans 
inhabiting parts of the globe prone to extreme heat or cold. Thus, air, 
food, water, and energy are all crucial to humans’ continued survival 
as a species and as a society. 
The Herculean task before governments around the world is 
determining how to meet these basic needs without destroying the 
global ecosystem. Habitat is just as crucial for survival, as it supports 
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continued access to clean air, food, and water. With climate change 
threatening many populations’ ability to continue meeting their basic 
needs, lives across the globe depend on crafting solutions that can be 
implemented immediately. 
Civil society recognized climate change as a threat to global 
existence at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) in Paris in 2015 by committing “to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global 
temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase 
even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.”2 The Paris Agreement entered 
into force on November 4, 2016.3 To date, 175 of the 197 Parties to the 
Convention have ratified the Agreement.4 
Despite global consensus on the need to mitigate the effects of, and 
adapt to, climate change,5 President Donald Trump announced on June 
1, 2017, “[i]n order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and 
its citizens, the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate 
Accord.”6 The response of other elected officials, similarly charged 
with safeguarding the health and welfare of American citizens, was 
immediate. New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced the 
state’s commitment to adhere to the standards contained in the Paris 
Accord “regardless of Washington’s irresponsible actions,” and signed 
an Executive Order “confirming New York’s leadership role in 
                                                                 
 2. Conference of Parties’ Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 
2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/
convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf; see also id. at art. 2(1)(a). 
 3. Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNFCCC, (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 4. Paris Agreement, supra note 2. See also Progress Tracker, Work Programme 
Resulting from the Relevant Requests Contained in Decision 1/CP.21, United 
Nations Climate Change Secretariat, June 20, 2017, http://unfccc.int/files/
paris_agreement/application/pdf/pa_progress_tracker_200617.pdf. 
 5. See generally Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). Climate 
Change 2007: Synthesis Report; Summary for Policymakers, IPCC, 2007, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_ 
assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm. 
 6. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Trump on 
the Paris Climate Accord, Rose Garden (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord. 
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protecting our citizens, our environment, and our planet.”7 Cuomo, in 
concert with California Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. and 
Washington State Governor Jay R. Inslee, formed the United States 
Climate Alliance – a coalition of states acting to uphold the 
commitments of the Paris Agreement.8 Cuomo’s rationale for 
upholding the Paris Agreement was simple and premised on basic 
survival. Quoting projected estimates of rising sea levels of one to four 
feet by the year 2100, Cuomo declared, “New York State would be 
devastated. . . . Even at a fraction of that rise, Manhattan as we know 
it would be gone, not to mention millions of people along the East 
Coast would be [d]isplaced, with hundreds of billions of dollars of real 
estate value disappeared.”9 
The public health consequences associated with failing to shift from 
fossil fuels to cleaner renewable energy sources are even more 
immediate than those associated with taking no action to mitigate the 
effects of climate change. Communities need not wait until 2100 to 
feel the disastrous effects of carbon emissions or to feel the benefits of 
reducing those emissions by moving away from fossil fuels. Experts 
attribute 6.5 million deaths annually to air pollution alone, noting that 
“[e]nergy production and use is the most important source of air 
pollution coming from human activity.”10 
                                                                 
 7. N.Y. Governor Andrew Cuomo Press Office, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo 
Signs Executive Order and Commits New York to Uphold the Standards Set Forth 
in the Paris Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-
andrew-m-cuomo-signs-executive-order-and-commits-new-york-uphold-standards-
set-forth. See also Executive Order No. 166, II (articulating New York’s policy to 
create a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and an 80% reduction 
by 2050), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
USClimateAllianceExecutiveOrder.pdf. 
 8. See N.Y. Governor Andrew Cuomo Press Office, New York Governor 
Cuomo, California Governor Brown, and Washington Governor Inslee Announce 
Formation of United States Climate Alliance; Cuomo, Brown and Inslee Will Serve 
as Co-Chairs, Urge Other States to Join Alliance (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/new-york-governor-cuomo-california-
governor-brown-and-washington-governor-inslee-announce. 
 9. Andrew Ratzkin, You Say You Want A Rev Solution: Considering New York’s 
Marquee Energy Initiative As Climate Change Policy, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 471, 
473 (2016) (quoting Governor Andrew Cuomo’s speech, Oct. 8, 2015). 
 10. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY AND AIR POLLUTION, 3 (2016), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutloo
kSpecialReport2016EnergyandAirPollution.pdf. 
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Coal combustion remains the world’s largest source of electricity 
generation.11 Relying on coal for power means releasing particulate 
matter (linked to respiratory problems such as asthma and lung 
cancer),12 sulfur dioxide (correlated with increased risk of death due to 
respiratory and cardiovascular complications),13 and nitrogen dioxide 
(associated with increased susceptibility to bacterial and viral 
infections, brachial inflammation, and decreased pulmonary 
function).14 Air pollution associated with coal combustion poses more 
than just respiratory problems. Because coal contains naturally 
occurring heavy metals such as mercury, these metals are released into 
the atmosphere as gas when coal is burned; coal combustion at power 
plants produces 26% of global mercury emissions.15 This mercury is 
deposited into waterways where it is converted to methylmercury, 
contaminating fish at all stages of the food chain and ultimately the 
humans who consume that fish.16 When pregnant women consume 
contaminated fish, the mercury emissions “locally, regionally, and 
internationally . . . can cause developmental effects in their offspring 
such as lower intelligence levels, delayed neurodevelopment, and 
subtle changes in vision, memory, and language.”17 
A common argument against transitioning away from coal 
generation to renewables, such as solar, is that renewables like solar 
are too expensive and cost consumers too much.18 However, if the true 
                                                                 
 11. Erica Burt, et al., Scientific Evidence of Health Effects from Coal Use in 
Energy Consumption, U. ILL. CHI. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, HEALTHCARE RESEARCH 
COLLABORATIVE 4 (2013), https://noharm-uscanada.org/sites/default/files/
documents-files/828/Health_Effects_Coal_Use_Energy_Generation.pdf (noting 
that “forty percent of world electricity comes from coal combustion.”). 
 12. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Science Assessment for Particulate 
Matter, EPA/600/R-08/139F (2009). 
 13. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Science Assessment for Sulfur Oxides - 
Health Criteria, EPA/600/R-08/047F (Sept. 2008). 
 14. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Science Assessment for Oxides of 
Nitrogen-Health Criteria, EPA/600/R-08/071 (July 2008). See also N.Y. STATE 
ENERGY PLANNING BOARD, THE ENERGY TO LEAD, IMPACTS & CONSIDERATIONS 8 
(2015) [hereinafter ENERGY TO LEAD]. 
 15. Burt, et al., supra note 11, at 8. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 9 (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG. (WHO), Exposure to Mercury: A Major 
Public Health Concern. Public Health and Environment 3 (2007)). 
 18. This argument is made despite the majority of cost-benefit studies showing a 
net benefit from solar. See Josh Garskof, How Utilities Are Fighting Back on Solar 
354 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
health and environmental costs of coal generation were included, 
consumer bills could triple.19 Some studies suggest that if all external 
costs of generating coal-fired electricity were accounted for, such costs 
would increase the price of electricity by 17.8 cents per kilowatt 
hour,20 reaching $500 billion annually.21 Other estimates accounting 
for the true cost of coal-fired electricity, namely environmental 
damage and impacts to public health, set the total price of electricity 
as high as 45 cents per kilowatt hour.22 
Given the high environmental and public health costs associated 
with coal generation, it is not surprising that many states such as New 
York are making strong public policy decisions to advance the 
proliferation of renewable resources. Shifting to cleaner, renewable 
sources of energy generation such as solar while decreasing coal usage 
can benefit the climate, public health, and the economy. Experts 
predict that the “public health benefits associated with reduced 
operating time of fossil-fuel generators can exceed $300,000 for each 
reduced ton of fine particulate emissions” before even considering the 
environmental and public health benefits of reducing sulfur dioxide 
and nitrogen dioxide emissions.23 
Experts recognize that coordinated energy systems planning is 
essential for states “to comprehensively analyze and respond to 
emerging affordability, environmental, reliability, economic planning 
and national security effects of supplying energy.”24 Since the turn of 
                                                                 
Power, CONSUMER REPS. (June 30, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/energy-
saving/how-utilities-are-fighting-back-on-solar-power/. 
 19. Burt, et al., supra note 11, at 10. 
 20. Kilowatt hours is the unit of measurement used to describe the amount of 
energy consumers use. See Charles M. Pratt, Electric Regulation in the State of New 
York, ASS’N BAR CITY NEW YORK COMM. ON ENERGY 1, 5, n.7 (Feb. 9, 2007), 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Dereg_report.pdf. Kilowatts are also used to 
express the amount of electric power that customers demand and a generator’s ability 
to supply that demand with its generating capacity. See id. at 5, n.8. 
 21. Paul R. Epstein, Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANN. 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 73 (2011). 
 22. Ben Machol & Sarah Rizk, Economic Value of U.S. Fossil Fuel Electricity 
Health Impacts, ENV’T INT’L 52, 75-80 (Feb. 2013). 
 23. Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity 
Grid: Distributed Generation and Net Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 91–
2 (2017). 
 24. Pratt, supra note 20, at 24. 
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the century, New York’s Committee on Energy has suggested that “the 
State’s most significant energy issue is the encouragement of 
construction of new generating capacity in regions of the State where 
it is needed.”25 Multiple reports and studies conducted throughout the 
early 2000s indicated that New York would face an energy supply 
shortage if it did not take steps to increase capacity.26 Thus, the New 
York State Committee on Energy concluded in 2007 that “steps should 
be taken to facilitate the addition of new generating capacity.”27 
New York’s challenge is the same one that the global community 
now faces: determining how to ensure generating capacity, 
transmission, and distribution in ways that safeguard public health, 
protect the environment, and reduce contributions to global warming.28 
Even before President Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement, 
New York was grappling with this challenge and attempting to resolve 
it with Cuomo’s 2014 Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) initiative. 
REV seeks to transform the energy market in New York, with the hope 
of charting a path forward that other states may follow. 
REV is ambitious in what it seeks to accomplish. The initiative is 
situated in largely unchartered territory and it is not without its fair 
share of criticism. Even cautious optimism may be premature, as 
leading experts note that “[n]othing like the REV has ever been done 
before. As such, its success, even as a deregulatory measure, must be 
considered contingent and uncertain.”29 REV is a series of collective, 
interrelated experiments on a massive scale. Given the dire effects of 
climate change and the public health impacts of energy production, the 
stakes of this experiment have never been higher. Many regulators and 
stakeholders question how the vision will be put into practice – a 
Herculean or Sisyphean task (or both), depending on who weighs in: 
                                                                 
 25. Id. at 25. 
 26. See e.g. NYISO, The Comprehensive Reliability Planning Process Reliability 
Needs Assessment, 4 (Dec. 21, 2005) (finding that, “because of load growth and no 
resource additions, the forecasted system for the next five years did not meet 
reliability criteria, meaning the system was not adequate to safely meet consumers 
energy requirements at all times in the face of scheduled and unscheduled outages”). 
See also New York City Energy Policy Task Force, New York City Energy Policy: 
An Electricity Resource Roadmap, 9-12 (Jan. 2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/
om/pdf/energy_task_force.pdf. 
 27. Pratt, supra note 20, at 11. 
 28. Id. at 25. 
 29. Ratzkin, supra note 9, at 476. 
356 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
[t]he REV has been called, even by its advocates, ‘devilishly 
complex’ . . . it promises to be a highly bureaucratic 
endeavor. Indeed, even among many people who should 
know – such as key industry participants and environmental 
advocates – it is hard to find individuals who profess truly to 
understand the REV. Given that lack of understanding, how 
can we, whether as citizens or policy makers, really be sure 
that the REV will deliver on its generalized emissions 
reduction promises?30  
Getting REV right would have significant, far-reaching impacts. A 
key component of REV is the integration of clean, renewable sources 
of energy generation into the electric grid. The successful integration 
of these resources – called Distributed Energy Resources or DERs – 
can have far-reaching impacts not just in terms of energy, but also in 
terms of agriculture, water, and land use. For example, the installation 
of solar panels (called distributed solar generation) can “improve water 
quality and address land degradation issues exacerbated by fossil fuel 
power plants.”31 The REV experiment strikes right at the intersection 
of energy, agriculture, water, and land use issues, all of which are tied 
to climate change. 
If implemented properly – and if successful – REV has the potential 
to reduce emissions from the two largest sectors of society contributing 
to climate change: electricity and agriculture.32 Energy and food 
systems are inextricably intertwined. Many call the challenges arising 
from the intersection of these fields “wicked problems” because they 
escape resolution by any single solution.33 Alternative energy systems, 
such as the nascent DER market in New York, could provide a 
potential systems-based solution that addresses the challenges in both 
the energy and agricultural sectors. For example, placing renewable 
                                                                 
 30. Id. 
 31. Revesz & Unel, supra note 23, at 92. 
 32. MICHAEL BLOOMBERG & CARL POPE, CLIMATE OF HOPE: HOW CITIES, 
BUSINESSES, AND CITIZENS CAN SAVE THE PLANET 155 (St. Martin’s Press 2017). 
Electricity and heat production account for 25% of GHGs, while agriculture and 
forestry account for 24%. See id. 
 33. Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin. M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160-69 (1973) (coining the phrase “wicked problems” 
to describe the particularly difficult-to-solve social policy problems). 
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energy systems like solar panels and anaerobic digesters onto farm 
land could shift reliance away from carbon-emitting sources of energy, 
thereby reducing GHGs. However, creating this shift requires 
implementing public polices targeted at incentivizing and regulating 
this developing market in ways that both maximize the value of DERs 
to the grid and local food systems and provide adequate consumer 
protection measures, especially for farmers. 
This article argues for the necessity of implementing adequate 
consumer protection measures in the retail access energy market 
before distributed energy resources can be successfully integrated on 
farms to mitigate climate change. Using New York’s retail access 
energy market as an analytical lens, this Article proceeds in three parts. 
Part I discusses how energy production and consumption impact 
public health, especially for vulnerable populations, resulting in the 
need for unique regulation of this sector. Part II describes New York’s 
history of regulation and deregulation of the energy sector and 
concludes with recent energy initiatives. Part III details a series of 
concerns related to these new initiatives and proposes policy 
recommendations for correcting market abuses and implementing 
additional consumer protection measures in the retail access energy 
market. 
I. ENERGY ISSUES ARE PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES 
Experts have recognized that access to safe and reliable electricity 
is necessary “for achieving good health and lack of access to it as ‘one 
of the principal barriers to the fulfillment of human potential and well-
being.’”34 One need only consider recent power outages from the 2017 
hurricane season to observe the crippling effects of losing access to 
this vital resource. For example, after Hurricane Irma tore through the 
Atlantic, Florida Power and Light’s president and CEO, Eric Silagy, 
estimated that half of Florida’s population was without power – 
totaling nearly 10 million people.35 In such instances, access to power 
                                                                 
 34. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 64 (quoting Anil Markandya, Electricity 
Generation and Health, THE LANCET 370, 979-90 (2007)). 
 35. Katie Zezima, Officials: Half of Florida lacks power, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 
11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2017/live-updates/weather/
hurricane-irma-a-monster-storms-devastating-path/officials-half-of-florida-lacks-
power/?utm_term=.d735bebd1850 [https://perma.cc/AFD2-P6P7]. 
358 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
can quickly become life or death; lack of access to life supporting 
machines in nursing homes and hospitals, exposure and heat 
exhaustion, and carbon monoxide poisoning from generators can all 
result from power outages.36 
Absence of reliable energy also exacts an emotional toll. Months 
after Hurricane Maria tore through Puerto Rico, half of the electric grid 
was still down.37 Reports of the rising toll on Puerto Ricans’ mental 
health was in the news, despite not commanding the same attention as 
the visible wounds and downed power lines.38 The psychological and 
physiological stress is far from over; estimates still predict parts of the 
island could remain dark for months.39 
In addition to natural disasters, world events and politics can create 
fuel shortages (consider America’s energy crisis in the 1970s resulting 
from the 1973 OPEC oil embargo), as can climate extremes in the 
absence of any storm (such as sustained droughts decreasing 
Venezuela’s ability to harness electricity due to the country sourcing 
70% of its electric generation from hydropower facilities).40 Despite 
awareness that “health depends on political as well as social, economic 
and cultural forces,” there are very few studies examining the effect 
that politics has on health, especially when those politics implicate 
energy demand and therefore influence public health outcomes.41 
Nevertheless, if politics is defined as “who gets what, when and how,” 
it stands to reason that politics necessarily effect how public policy 
                                                                 
 36. See e.g., Jim Turner, Hurricane Irma death toll in Florida at 34 – and rising, 
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/
2017/09/18/irma-death-toll-florida-34-and-rising/677493001/ 
[https://perma.cc/VQZ6-LDEB]. 
 37. See Quil Lawrence, In Puerto Rico, The Crisis After Hurricane Maria is 
Taxing Residents’ Mental Health, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/13/563894775/in-puerto-rico-the-crisis-after-
hurricane-maria-is-taxing-residents-mental-healt [https://perma.cc/F4XK-ZYMV]. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Frances Robles & Patricia Mazzei, Parts of Puerto Rico Won’t Have 
Power for 8 Months. What’s the Holdup?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/23/us/puerto-rico-power-outage.html 
[https://perma.cc/NG53-YT9E]. 
 40. See Gretchen Bakke, The Electricity Crisis in Venezuela: A Cautionary Tale, 
THE NEW YORKER (May 17, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-
electricity-crisis-in-venezuela-a-cautionary-tale [https://perma.cc/U8M5-43CX]. 
 41. Vincent Navarro, Politics and Health: A Neglected Area of Research, 18 EUR. 
J. OF PUB. HEALTH 354 (2008). 
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may be implemented in the health sector.42 Because politics often 
determines who receives what services subsidized by whom, it follows 
that public policy can influence energy demand, thereby implicating 
health outcomes. 
Beyond natural disasters, international relations, politics, and 
extreme climatic conditions such as drought, poverty is another factor 
depriving entire communities of safe or reliable access to electricity. 
Current estimates suggest that 12.7% of the U.S. population43 lives in 
poverty – a total of 40.6 million people.44 In addition to income level, 
energy burden is an important indicator of whether a family is likely 
to experience a lack of access to energy. One’s energy burden is “the 
percentage of a customer’s income spent on energy.”45 Experts 
calculate that an energy burden greater than 6% renders energy 
unaffordable.46 Lower-income households bear energy burdens of 10-
20%. This is far higher than the energy burden carried by middle-to-
upper income households, which typically carry energy burdens of 1-
5%.47 Energy burdens above 6% that suggest the cost of energy is 
unaffordable are significant because “[n]umerous studies have 
established the link between energy unaffordability and poor health 
outcomes. In particular, utility shutoffs, bill debt, and inefficient 
weatherization have been linked to increased cases of pneumonia, 
bronchitis, other illnesses, and hunger among low-income 
communities.”48 Due to the high social costs of energy unaffordability, 
federal and state financial assistance programs exist to help low-
                                                                 
 42. Amanda Glassman & Kent Buse, Politics, and Public Health Policy Reform, 
5 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. HEALTH 163 (2008). 
 43. See JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2016 12 (U.S. Census Bureau ed., 2017). 
 44. See id. For a one-person household, the poverty level was set at $12,228 in 
2016 (gross income), $15,569 for a family of two, and $24,563 for a family of four. 
See id. at 43. 
 45. Adrienne L. Thompson, Protecting Low-Income Ratepayers As the 
Electricity System Evolves, 37 ENERGY L. J. 265, 268–69 (2016). 
 46. See Adam Chandler, Where the Poor Spend More Than 10 Percent of Their 
Income on Energy, THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2016/06/energy-poverty-low-income-households/486197/ 
[https://perma.cc/N9GM-6DHP]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Thompson, supra note 45, at 270. 
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income families pay their energy bills.49 Nevertheless, such programs 
do not provide sufficient assistance to everyone in need.50 
High energy burdens and government assistance programs that fail 
to fill the gaps mean that many consumers must make a Hobson’s 
choice every month: deciding whether to pay the energy bill or whether 
to pay for other vital needs such as medical services and food.51 In 
New York alone, more than one quarter-million customers every year 
experience involuntary utility shut-offs, while one in eight residential 
New York customers have a utility bill more than two months in 
arrears.52 Addressing the energy burdens consumers face must be a key 
consideration of any public policy seeking to shift energy consumption 
away from fossil fuels and towards renewable sources: 
[b]ecause these ratepayers already carry a significantly 
higher energy burden than other customers, they are 
particularly vulnerable to rising costs and to the rate 
structure reforms contemplated in most grid modernization 
processes active today. The question becomes, then: as these 
                                                                 
 49. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., Energy Assistance, BENEFITS 
(2017), https://www.benefits.gov/benefits/browse-by-category/category/27. The 
program eligibility requirements for participating in the federal Low Income Home 
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) are calculated based on income level and the 
percentage of income spent on energy bills; for example, to qualify, a one-person 
household must earn less than $17,820 per year, a two-person household less than 
$24,030, and a four-person household less than $36,450; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program 
(LIHEAP), BENEFITS (2017), https://www.benefits.gov/benefits/benefit-details/623 
[hereinafter LIHEAP]. 
 50. See Chandler, supra note 46. For example, in North Carolina, less than 50 
percent of families in need received adequate financial assistance. See id. Moreover, 
less than a quarter of families who meet LIHEAP eligibility requirements actually 
receive those benefits. See GENE FALK ET AL., NEED-TESTED BENEFITS: ESTIMATED 
ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT RECEIPT BY FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS 39 
(Congressional Research Service ed., 2015). 
 51. See Chandler, supra note 46; see also Dan Boyce & Jordan Wirfs-Brock, 
Energy Assistance Struggles to Meet Demand, COLORADOAN (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2016/05/23/energy-assistance-programs-
struggle-meet-demand-low-income-coloradans/84812402/ [http://perma.cc/KEA7-
UVLE]. 
 52. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy 
Framework and Implementation Plan, Case 14-M-0101 (Feb. 26, 2015). 
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electricity system reforms proceed, what policies can be 
implemented to complement the overarching goals of these 
reforms, while also protecting low-income customers?53  
Integrating renewable sources of energy into the electric grid is 
necessary to help states like New York fulfill their environmental 
pledges. Yet, policy makers must keep in mind that the goal cannot be 
renewables at any cost. The need for integrating renewable resources 
into the electric grid must be balanced with providing necessary 
consumer protections to ensure ratepayers already facing 
insurmountable energy burdens are not paying more than necessary.54 
II. REGULATING NEW YORK’S ELECTRICITY MARKET 
High energy prices motivated the restructuring of New York’s 
electricity market in the 1990s. New York’s electricity market was 
originally a regulated monopoly. The utilities were vertically 
integrated entities, meaning that they provided consumers with the 
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity. New 
York began efforts to deregulate or restructure its electricity market by 
allowing entities other than utilities to sell electricity to end-users.55 
The restructuring process attempted to replace the monopoly system 
of electric utilities with an open, competitive market for consumers to 
select electricity suppliers while still receiving delivery through the 
same local utilities’ power lines.56 The New York State Public Service 
Commission (the Commission) envisioned allowing additional 
participants into the commodity market to encourage competition, 
provide better commodity service, offer diverse energy products with 
added value, and lower costs for consumers.57 
                                                                 
 53. Thompson, supra note 45, at 285. 
 54. See infra Part II.B. 
 55. New York also permitted other entities to sell the commodity of natural gas 
to end-users, but this article focuses solely on the electric industry. See e.g., See State 
of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Address 
Issues Associated with the Restructuring of the Emerging Competitive Natural Gas 
Market, Case 93-G-0932 (Dec. 20, 1994). 
 56. See “Restructuring,” Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=R. 
 57. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of Competitive 
Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, Opinion and Order Regarding 
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A. The Process of Restructuring: 1990s 
In lieu of regulating electric utilities as monopolies, the Commission 
has been committed for decades to encouraging competition with the 
hope of lower prices for consumers.58 The Commission set about 
restructuring New York’s electricity market in reliance on its 
experiences in the natural gas and telecommunications industries, 
noting that “[w]here genuine competition has replaced regulated 
monopoly, customers have had little reason for regret.”59 Policy 
makers in the state believed that allowing competition would 
encourage lower prices through increased energy efficiency and 
demand response efforts.60 
Energy efficiency refers to the conservation of energy and a 
reduction in the amount of energy used. Improved energy efficiency 
increases the electricity generation and transmission capacity that can 
then be dedicated elsewhere.61 Common energy efficiency measures 
include air sealing and insulating buildings or purchasing certified 
                                                                 
Competitive Opportunities for Electric Service, Case 94-E-0952 (May 20, 1996); see 
also Stephen P. Sherwin, Deregulation of Electricity in New York: A Continuing 
Odyssey 1996-2001, 12 ALB. J. SCI. & TECH. 263, 268-70 (2001). Given that the 
Commission still possesses some regulatory authority over the electricity market 
(including the utilities and other market participants), this article asserts that New 
York’s deregulation of its electricity markets is more properly described by the term 
“restructuring” rather than “deregulation” and therefore uses the former term. 
 58. See e.g., Restructuring of the Emerging Competitive Natural Gas Market, 
supra note 57; see also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of 
the Commission to Examine Issues Related to the Continuing Provision of Universal 
Service and to Develop a Regulatory Framework for the Transition to Competition 
in the Local Exchange Market, Case 94-C-0095 (May 22, 1996). 
 59. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. 
 60. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. Notably, at this time, ESCOs offer demand response programs only 
to large commercial and industrial customers – not to mass market customers. See 
State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy 
Service Companies et al., Case 15-M-0127 (Dec. 12, 2017) (cross-examination 
testimony of the Impacted ESCO Coalition, admitting they do not offer demand 
response programs to residential customers despite claiming demand response 
programs as one of the unique value-added services that they provide above the 
default utility service). 
 61. See Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, An Illustrative Framework for 
a Clean Energy Standard for The Power Sector 5 (2011). 
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energy efficient household appliances.62 Such energy efficiency 
measures can be considered a type of DER because these measures 
generate energy savings, often calculated in terms of “negawatts,” that 
can then be used elsewhere in the grid.63 
In contrast, demand response programs rely on consumers to 
voluntarily participate in programs that encourage the adjustment of 
energy usage to certain times of day when there is less demand on the 
power grid or when more renewable energy is available.64 Successful 
demand response programs provide consumers with the opportunity to 
receive incentives in return for reducing non-essential energy use or 
shifting use to non-peak energy consumption times of the day.65 In 
addition, demand response programs reduce congestion on the electric 
grid and contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions created from 
residential and commercial sectors of the energy market.66 For 
example, the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)67 
facilitates two types of demand response programs: reliability-based 
demand response programs and economic-based demand response 
programs.68 The purpose of NYISO’s reliability-based programs is to 
relieve stress on the grid when demand for electricity is above the 
normal peak period levels due to unplanned events like extreme heat, 
inclement weather, and transmission outages.69 In return for load 
reduction when the electric grid is stressed, consumers are provided 
with monetary compensation.70 Similarly, the economic-based 
                                                                 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, WHAT IS DEMAND RESPONSE? (2014). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. The NYISO regulates New York’s transmission facilities to ensure the 
reliability of the state’s power system and coordinates the wholesale market 
(including daily purchases of electricity and related operations) to distribute the 
electricity supply throughout the state. See NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM 
OPERATOR (2018), https://home.nyiso.com/. 
 68. NYISO DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
(FAQS) FOR PROSPECTIVE RESOURCES, NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM 
OPERATOR (2016). The two programs within the reliability-based category are the 
Installed Capacity – Special Case Resource Program and the Emergency Demand 
Response Program. 
 69. See id. at 1. 
 70. See id. 
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demand response programs also seek to reduce load demand.71 
However, the economic-based programs are different in that they 
allow consumers the opportunity to receive compensation at any time 
for participating in load reduction, regardless of the reliability needs 
of the grid.72 
In seeking lower prices for consumers through energy efficiency and 
demand response efforts, regulators responsible for restructuring New 
York’s electricity market aimed to do so in accordance with the 
principles of resource management, customer service, reliability and 
safety, competitive market characteristics, and economic 
efficiency/development.73 During the ensuing collaborative 
restructuring process, all stakeholders agreed on the general principles 
but they disagreed on which principles were primary.74 For example, 
the Commission emphasized the “economic and environmental well-
being” of the state and opined that this principle was primary above all 
others.75 In contrast, the state Consumer Protection Board argued for a 
stronger focus on reducing rates for all consumers. The environmental 
agencies (i.e. the State Energy Office, the Department of 
Environmental Quality, and the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority [NYSERDA]) took a third position, 
advocating for additional policy guidance on transitioning to more 
robust competition.76 
                                                                 
 71. See id. at 2. The two programs that are economically based include: the Day 
Ahead Demand Response Program and the Demand-Side Ancillary Services 
Program. 
 72. See id. at 2. 
 73. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. Fourteen other states and the District of Columbia also have 
restructured or deregulated their electricity and gas energy markets (California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia), while other states have 
partially or fully restructured the electricity or the gas retail access market. See Map 
of Deregulated Energy States and Markets (Updated 2017), ELECTRIC CHOICE 
(2017), https://www.electricchoice.com/map-deregulated-energy-markets/. 
 74. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. 
 75. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. 
 76. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. 
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Despite general agreement to transition New York’s energy industry 
away from a regulated monopoly and towards a competitive market, 
the process involved several complexities. Shifting from a regulated 
monopoly to a competitive market required grappling with a loss of 
tax revenue,77 managing utility investor expectations,78 achieving 
environmental goals,79 and fulfilling social responsibilities.80 Since the 
early 1990’s the Commission warned of the need for coordination of 
resources in transitioning to a competitive market, lest “any substantial 
near term reduction in prices and/or bills for some customers . . . 
largely come at the expense of increased prices to others.”81 The 
themes of balancing costs for consumers, mitigating environmental 
harm, and striving for interagency coordination recurred throughout 
the restructuring process. 
Beginning in 1996, the Commission (1) directed the electric 
utilities’ divesture of their generation facilities, (2) coordinated with 
the NYISO in its operation of the state’s wholesale energy market and 
bulk power transmission system, and (3) permitted the entry of Electric 
Service Companies (ESCOs) into the retail market space to compete 
with utilities for the opportunity to sell electricity to end-users.82 The 
                                                                 
 77. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. When deregulation efforts began in New York, utilities paid state and 
local taxes to the tune of $2.1 billion per year. See id. Projections anticipated that the 
next decade would generate $30 billion of tax revenue. See id. The utilities’ tax costs 
are passed on to consumers. See MARILYN M. RUBIN, A GUIDE TO NEW YORK STATE 
TAXES: HISTORY, ISSUES AND CONCERNS vi (2011) (explaining that New York 
utilities must pay the State Gross Receipts and 9A Corporation Franchise Taxes, 
local business income and gross receipts taxes, state and local sales taxes, and local 
property taxes). 
 78. Utility investors in New York have historically been confident in recovering 
their prudent investment costs through the rate setting process. See In the Matter of 
Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, supra note 57. 
 79. For example, utilities might purchase certain amounts of renewable resource 
generation, promote energy efficiency programs, or educate consumers about 
demand side management (DSM) or demand-side response (DSR) incentives. See In 
the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, supra note 57. 
 80. For example, continuing to administer New York’s Low-Income Home 
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). See LIHEAP, supra note 49. 
 81. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. 
 82. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, ELECTRIC REGULATION IN THE STATE OF N.Y. 1 
(The Association of the Bar of the City of New York ed. 2007). Note, the 
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NYISO operates wholesale market transactions involving generation 
and bulk power transmission facilities.83 In contrast, the retail markets 
in which utilities and ESCOs operate include the sale and delivery of 
energy and capacity to end-users.84 The restructuring of New York’s 
electric industry thus required utilities to divest their generation 
facilities so that they no longer supply end users with electricity 
derived from their own generating sources.85 As a result of the 
restructuring process, load-serving entities (LSE), which are utilities 
or ESCOs, have three options to source generation capacity: (1) LSEs 
with long-term power supply agreements executed prior to 
restructuring may finish the terms of these legacy agreements; (2) 
LSEs may maintain multiple medium-term and short-term power 
supply agreements in their supply portfolios; and (3) LSEs may make 
capacity purchases in the markets that the NYISO administers.86 
B. Concerns in the Restructured Market Place 
As noted above, the restructuring process involved the entry of 
ESCOs into the retail energy market to compete with the utilities to 
sell energy commodities (i.e. natural gas and electricity) directly to 
New York residents, small business owners, and commercial and 
industrial customers.87 The Commission’s purpose in allowing ESCOs 
to compete with the utilities in the retail energy market was twofold. 
First, the Commission sought to increase competition in the hopes of 
lowering the price of energy. Second, the Commission sought to create 
space for energy suppliers to innovate by providing consumers with a 
range of other valuable energy products, such as energy efficiency or 
                                                                 
Commission possesses no direct regulatory authority over NYISO, as the NYISO’s 
management of the competitive wholesale market falls under the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authority. FERC authorized the creation of the 
NYISO in 1998. Order Rejecting Revised Compliance Filing, Federal Energy 
Guidelines: FERC Reports (FERC), 83 FERC ¶ 61,352 (Oct. 28, 1999). 
 83. See COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, supra note 82. The NYISO oversees auction 
markets for electric energy, electric capacity, and all ancillary services such as 
maintaining sufficient operating reserves, control and dispatch, and the capability to 
start generators in the event of a system shutdown. See id. at 5. 
 84. See id. at 6. 
 85. See id. at 9-10. 
 86. See id. at 5-7. 
 87. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57. 
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demand response measures.88 Regulators also anticipated that ESCOs 
would eventually offer consumers lower energy prices compared to 
utilities by finding more efficient and innovative ways to purchase 
energy on the wholesale market and passing the savings on to 
consumers.89 The Commission expected the market to “produce, over 
time, rates that will be lower than they would be under a regulated 
environment.”90 
1. History of Proceedings and Problems in the Retail Energy 
Market 
The Commission’s ultimate goal was not merely to provide ESCOs 
with access to the retail energy market; rather, ESCOs were a means 
to achieving the end of providing consumers with lower energy prices 
and other valuable benefits.91 The Commission recognized that market 
restructuring was an evolutionary process requiring oversight and 
regulation because retail competition was fraught with “significant 
risks and requires considerable caution, and should be provided only 
if it is in the best interests of all consumers.”92 Accordingly, the 
                                                                 
 88. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57; see also Sherwin, supra note 57, at 268-70. At the evidentiary hearing, 
New York Department of Services Staff (“DPS Staff”) testified that they had 
reviewed the various products ESCOs claimed to offer and compared those products 
to the prices ESCOs were charging above default utility service. For example, for 
ESCOs claiming to offer value added services such as LED lightbulbs and 
thermostats, DPS Staff explained that “those products are variously available as a 
general commodity in hardware stores, Lowes, Home Depot, at a very reasonable 
price. And therefore, any premium associated for those products offered by the 
ESCO, that value was not commensurate with the premium that the ESCOs were 
charging for those products.” See In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy 
Service Companies et al., supra note 60, at 2500-01. 
 89. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57, at 30-39. 
 90. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57, at 28-30. 
 91. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57, at 30-33. 
 92. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 
supra note 57, at 13 (quoting recommended decision of Administrative Law Judge). 
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Commission committed itself to monitoring market development and 
stated that it would “take corrective action should problems arise.”93 
a. The Commission Creates (and Repeatedly Revises) a Set of 
Uniform Business Practices 
At first, the Commission monitored the market by creating an 
eligibility process for ESCOs seeking to enter the retail energy 
market.94 Once the Commission deemed an ESCO eligible, the ESCO 
could then sell electricity and gas directly to consumers.95 To ensure 
adequate consumer protections in this new competitive market, in 
February 1999 the Commission established the Uniform Business 
                                                                 
 93. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Opinion and Order Establishing 
Regulatory Policies for the Provision of Retail Energy Services, Case 94-E-0952 
(May 19, 1997). 
 94. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-
M-1343 (2014). As of 2015, such requirements included, among others, providing a 
sample standard sales agreement for each customer class, procedures for obtaining 
customer authorization for the ESCO to access customers’ historic usage, internal 
procedures to prevent unauthorized switching of customer accounts from utilities to 
ESCOs (slamming), copies of marketing materials, copies of the ESCOs’ quality 
assurance program, disclosure of any criminal or regulatory sanctions imposed 
against any senior officers of the ESCO in the last three years, and a list of all third-
party agents the ESCO contracted with to market to potential customers. See id. at 
6-7. 
 95. See Uniform Business Practices, supra note 94, at 2 (defining ESCOs as 
entities “eligible to sell electricity and/or natural gas to end-use customers using the 
transmission or distribution system of a utility” and stating that such ESCOs “may 
perform other retail service functions”). New York has a long-standing public policy 
of prioritizing residents’ access to commodity energy services, recognizing that such 
access is central to protecting the health, safety, and welfare of citizens. See Home 
Energy Fair Practices Act and Energy Consumer Protection Act, Public Service Law, 
Art. 2 § 44(1)(30) (2003) (“HEFPA”) (the “continued provision of . . . gas, electric 
and steam service to all residential customers without unreasonable qualifications or 
lengthy delays is necessary for the preservation of the health and general welfare and 
is in the public interest.”). HEFPA provides New York residents with various 
consumer protections, such as procedures for customer billing, payment, and 
complaints. See e.g., id. at § 32 (termination); id. at § 33-34 (multiple dwelling shut-
offs); id. at § 35 (reconnection); id. at § 36 (deposits); id. at § 37 (deferred payments); 
id. at § 38 (budget plans); id. at § 40 (third-party notice before termination). The New 
York Legislature extended these protections to ESCO customers through the Energy 
Consumer Protection Act of 2002. See Energy Consumer Protection Act, N.Y. STAT. 
L. 2002, CH. 686. (2002). 
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Practices (UBP). The UBP provides a minimum set of guidelines to 
which ESCOs must adhere to maintain their eligibility to serve retail 
customers.96 The UBP is intended to standardize practices among the 
utilities and the ESCOs to protect consumers.97 
Since establishing the UBP, the Commission has modified them 
several times to address changes in the market and the enhanced need 
for consumer protection. For example, on October 15, 2008, the 
Commission amended the UBP in response to ESCOs employing 
improper marketing practices.98 In its October 2008 Order, the 
Commission attempted to enhance the marketing standards to “provide 
even greater confidence and security to consumers.”99 In 2010, the 
Commission further amended the UBP, requiring ESCOs to provide 
consumers with notice of a Consumer Bill of Rights whenever retail 
services are offered.100 Due to ESCOs’ continued questionable 
marketing behavior (and behavior of their sales agents), the Consumer 
Bill of Rights provides, among other things: “[n]o person who sells or 
offers for sale any energy services for, or on behalf of, an ESCO shall 
engage in any deceptive acts or practices in the marketing of energy 
services.”101 In addition, the ESCO Consumer Bill of Rights expressly 
permits the New York State Attorney General to bring a civil action 
against any ESCO suspected of violating the Bill of Rights 
provisions.102 The Consumer Bill of Rights also authorizes citizen suit 
provisions as another means of seeking redress for violations.103 The 
Commission amended the UBP yet again on February 25, 2014, 
                                                                 
 96. See Uniform Business Practices, supra note 94. 
 97. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Opinion and Order Concerning 
Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-M-1343 (1999). 
 98. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Amendments to the 
Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-M-1343 (2008). 
 99. Press Release, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Oct. 15, 2008) (on file with author). 
 100. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Implementing Chapter 416 of 
the Laws of 2010, Case 98-M-1343 (2010); see also Energy Services Company 
Consumers Bill of Rights, § 349-d (2011). 
 101. See Energy Services Company Consumers Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 
§ 349-d(3). 
 102. See Energy Services Company Consumers Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 
§ 349-d(9). 
 103. See Energy Services Company Consumers Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 
§ 349-d(10). 
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requiring greater transparency of ESCO prices to protect mass market 
customers (i.e. residential and small business customers).104 
b.  The New York State Attorney General Investigates 
Despite the additional consumer protections contained in the UBP, 
abuses persisted in the market place. Years of Attorney General 
investigations have revealed hundreds of customer complaints related 
to deceptive ESCO marketing tactics.105 For example, customers 
complained of being charged higher prices, not receiving promised 
savings on their energy bills, and being the recipients of harassing 
door-to-door sales behavior. Customers also expressed that ESCO 
sales agents demonstrated a general disregard of the UBP consumer 
protection provisions, including failing to provide customers with a 
written copy of the ESCO Consumer’s Bill of Rights and failing to 
provide customers with written notice of the right to cancel contracts 
within three days.106 Since 2000, the Attorney General’s investigations 
have resulted in eight settlements that provided injunctive relief and 
millions of dollars in restitution and penalties.107 
                                                                 
 104. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Taking Actions to Improve the 
Residential and Small Non-residential Retail Access Markets, Case 12-M-0476 
(2014). 
 105. It is also important to recognize that the number of complaints “is typically 
the tip of the iceberg.” See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of 
Eligibility Criteria for Energy Service Companies et al., Case 15-M-0127 (2017) 
(NYAG expert witness Jane Azia testifying to the NYAG complain rates for ESCO 
customers). For example, in HIKO, the NYAG received “about 300 complaints over 
three years as the time period that was covered by the settlement, but refunds were 
made to approximately 2,500 people who were found to be eligible.” Id. at 1794-95. 
 106. See THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, OVERSIGHT OF COMPLAINT ACTIVITY 8 (New 
York State Office of the State Comptroller ed., 2017) (auditing the period from 
January 1, 2012 through August 19, 2016 and finding 150% increase in complaints, 
from 1,956 to 4,922). 
 107. See e.g., In the Matter of Total Gas & Electric, Inc., Assurance of 
Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law §63 (15) (Mar. 9, 2001) [hereinafter 
TG&E AOD]; People v. ECONnergy Energy Co., N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. No. 
401384/02 (Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter ECON Consent Judgment]; People v. 
ECONnergy Energy Co., N.Y. County Supreme Court Index No. 401384/02 (filed 
Mar. 26, 2002) [hereinafter ECON Petition]; In the Matter of New York Energy 
Savings Corp., Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15) 
(July 14, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Savings AOD]; In the Matter of New York 
Energy Savings Corp., Addendum to the Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to 
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For example, the Attorney General’s Office launched an 
investigation of Energy Plus, a Delaware-based ESCO serving New 
Yorkers with its principal offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.108 As 
a result of this investigation, the Attorney General’s Office concluded 
that Energy Plus had made false and misleading savings claims to 
customers, failed to fully disclose the extent of its early termination 
fees, and did not clearly disclose other material terms and conditions 
of its contracts as required under the UBP and the New York’s General 
Business Law and Executive Law.109 Energy Plus’ website and written 
advertising materials claimed that its prices were lower than, or 
competitive with, the prices that the utilities were charging consumers. 
For example, a review of Energy Plus’ direct mail offers revealed that 
the company claimed its energy rates were “market based” and 
“competitive” or “risk-free.”110 However, the investigation revealed 
that Energy Plus customers were paying up to $440 more per year than 
similarly situated customers receiving commodity service from the 
default utility service provider.111 
In addition to paying higher commodity prices, Energy Plus 
customers were also told they could cancel their contracts at any time. 
However, Energy Plus routinely delayed processing such cancellations 
by a period of two months, forcing consumers to continue paying 
                                                                 
Executive Law § 63(15) (Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Savings AOD 
Addendum]; In the Matter of Columbia Utilities, LLC, Assurance of Discontinuance 
Pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (15) (Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Columbia AOD]; 
Letter from Keith Gordon, Asst. Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Frauds, to 
Dietrich Snell, Counsel for Columbia Utilities, LLC and Columbia Utilities Power, 
LLC (Feb. 28, 2014); In the Matter of the Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman, 
Attorney General of New York, of HIKO Energy, LLC, Assurance of Discontinuance 
Pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (15) (Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter HIKO AOD]; In the 
Matter of the Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, 
of Energy Plus Holdings LLC and Energy Plus Natural Gas LLC, Assurance of 
Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15) (Aug. 28, 2017) [hereinafter 
Energy Plus AOD]; and A.G. Schneiderman Announces $550,000 Settlement With 
Energy Service Company That Illegally Deceived New York Consumers (Apr. 22, 
2018), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-550000-
settlement-energy-service-company-illegally-deceived (Liberty Press Release). 
 108. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 8. 
 109. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 13-29. 
 110. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 14. 
 111. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 15. 
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higher rates for an additional sixty days.112 Energy Plus also induced 
customers to enroll in commodity service with cash back offers and 
other enrollment bonuses, but failed to disclose that such rewards were 
not available until after customers had been receiving ESCO 
commodity service for at least two months; in other instances, 
consumers were not deemed eligible to receive the rewards until they 
had been enrolled with the ESCO for a full year.113 
On August 28, 2017, Energy Plus settled the claims by paying 
$800,000 in restitution to the Attorney General’s Office for 
distribution to former customers.114 The settlement also required 
Energy Plus to meet several other conditions, including the cessation 
of making misleading marketing representations and a requirement to 
provide potential customers with twelve consecutive months of rate 
comparisons between the local utility and Energy Plus if it wished to 
make any savings claims.115 Energy Plus also agreed to implement 
training and monitoring of its customer service representatives and 
sales agents.116 
Deceptive marketing practices were even more egregious for 
ESCOs that engaged in door-to-door sales communications with 
residential consumers or small business owners. The Attorney 
General’s Office recently settled another case with the ESCO HIKO 
after investigating the company’s door-to-door marketing practices. 
HIKO is a New York corporation and was authorized by the 
Commission to sell electricity and natural gas to residential and 
commercial customers throughout the state.117 From 2011 to 2014, 
more than 300 consumers lodged complaints with the Commission 
regarding HIKO’s marketing practices, which included hiring third-
party marketers to solicit customers through door-to-door and 
telemarketing channels.118 The Attorney General’s investigation 
revealed that HIKO was making misleading savings claims119 and 
                                                                 
 112. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 18. 
 113. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 22-24. 
 114. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at Part II ¶ 15. 
 115. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at Part II ¶ 4(b). 
 116. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at Part II ¶ 7-14. 
 117. See HIKO AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 8 
 118. See HIKO AOD, supra note 107, at ¶11-12. 
 119. For example, one sales script directed marketers to promise consumers of 
energy savings of up to 7% over the course of a year on HIKO’s variable rate plan. 
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failing to timely process cancellation requests.120 HIKO also engaged 
in slamming – the illegal practice of enrolling customers without their 
knowledge or consent.121 For example, telemarketers would create the 
impression that they worked for the distribution utilities and then tell 
customers they were entitled to a “rebate” that could only be processed 
if the customers provided their account information.122 Once the 
customers provided their account information, HIKO sales 
representatives switched the customers from utility service to ESCO 
service without their knowledge.123 HIKO ultimately agreed to pay 
$1.25 million in restitution and adhere to other conditions similar to 
those contained in the Energy Plus settlement.124 In addition, HIKO 
agreed to cease all slamming practices, including representing that its 
agents worked on behalf of the local distribution utility or failing to 
obtain signed contracts from the customer of record.125 
Following another investigation in 2011, the New York Attorney 
General’s Office settled similar fraudulent marketing claims against an 
ESCO named Columbia Utilities, LLC and its affiliate, Columbia 
Utilities Power, LLC (collectively Columbia) for $2 million.126 
Although Columbia agreed to implement training and monitoring 
programs of its marketing agents similar to the programs agreed to by 
HIKO and Energy Plus, customer complaints persisted. This continued 
misbehavior led to a modified settlement agreement in 2014 whereby 
                                                                 
See id. at ¶ 16. At the same time, the company’s website similarly advertised that 
consumers would experience lower utility bills. See id. at ¶ 16. In fact, the 
investigation revealed that consumers were routinely paying between $86 to $300 
more over the course of a year than if they had remained full service customers under 
the default utility’s service. See id. at ¶ 14. 
 120. For example, the investigation revealed several instances of consumers 
calling HIKO’s customer service center to cancel their contracts but being unable to 
reach anyone and they could not leave a voicemail because they received a recording 
stating the mailbox was full. See id. at ¶ 27. 
 121. See id. at ¶ 13-30. For example, one customer complained that a HIKO sales 
agent had asked to see her utility bill, claiming a need to check the customer’s rate, 
and then asked for a glass of water. When the consumer left the room to fill a glass 
of water, the sales agent copied the Distribution Utility account information and 
falsified consent to switch the customer’s service to the ESCO. See id. at ¶ 26. 
 122. See id. at ¶ 20-21. 
 123. See id. at ¶ 20-21. 
 124. See id. at ¶ 21. 
 125. See id. at ¶ 3-7. 
 126. See Columbia AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 31, 55 
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Columbia agreed, among other things, to cease its door-to-door 
marketing entirely.127 
As early as 2008, the Attorney General’s Office executed an 
Assurance of Discontinuance with New York Energy Corp., doing 
business as U.S. Energy Savings, following an investigation of the 
ESCO’s business practices.128 The parties executed an Addendum to 
the Assurance of Discontinuance in 2009, following subsequent 
settlement negotiations because consumers continued filing 
complaints.129 The majority of consumer complaints fell into the same 
categories the Attorney General had investigated in other ESCO cases: 
promised savings that never materialized, marketers who represented 
that they were affiliated with the local utility, difficulty reaching a 
customer service representative through the telephone number 
provided for contract cancellations, and marketers who failed to 
disclose the fees associated with contract terminations outside of the 
statutorily required cancellation period.130 As a condition of the 
settlement, U.S. Energy Savings agreed to a number of verification 
practices, including explaining that U.S. Energy Savings was not 
affiliated with the local utility, verifying in writing or via recorded 
phone calls that all consumer sales contracts demonstrated an actual 
request to use U.S. Energy Savings as the commodity supplier, 
disclosing the amount of early termination fees, and guaranteeing that 
consumers had not been promised less expensive commodity rates 
compared to the local utility except in instances where the ESCO could 
demonstrate actual savings.131 In addition to the verification 
procedures, U.S. Energy Savings also agreed to engage in a variety of 
vetting and monitoring practices for its independent sales contractors. 
Such vetting included requiring disclosure of any misdemeanors and 
felonies in the hiring application, conducting background checks, 
checking applicants’ references, and terminating contracts with 
                                                                 
 127. See Columbia AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 46-54; see also Letter from Keith 
Gordon, supra note 107. As a condition of the modified settlement agreement, 
Columbia was required to seek approval from the Attorney General’s Office in the 
event it wished to resume its door-to-door marketing program. See Letter from Keith 
Gordon, supra note 107. 
 128. See generally U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107. 
 129. See generally U.S. Energy Savings AOD Addendum, supra note 107. 
 130. See U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107. 
 131. See U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107, at 7 ¶ 34. 
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independent contractors who repeatedly failed to disclose their actual 
affiliation or who falsely promised consumers immediate savings.132 
Such investigations are not a recent phenomenon. The Attorney 
General’s Office has been investigating ESCOs and their marketing 
practices since the restructuring process began over two decades ago. 
That such investigations continue – and that addendums to settlement 
agreements need to be issued after consumers continue filing 
complaints – suggests that additional regulatory reforms are needed.133 
2. Current Proceedings 
To date, the Commission has deemed approximately 200 ESCOs 
eligible to provide electric and natural gas commodity service to New 
                                                                 
 132. See U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107, at 8-9. 
 133. For example, in 2002, the Attorney General’s Office filed a petition under 
New York Executive Law § 63(12) for injunctive and monetary relief against an 
ESCO called ECONnergy Energy Company, Inc., alleging that the ESCO engaged 
in a variety of repeated and persistent deceptive and illegal business practices while 
marketing its electricity and natural gas services. See ECON Petition, supra note 107, 
at 1 ¶ 2; see also id. at 5 ¶ 17 (including actions such as slamming, misrepresenting 
the identity of its doo-to-door sales agents, and misrepresenting the potential savings 
customers could expect if they switched to ECONnergy’s commodity service). A 
Consent Judgment and Order was issued on September 23, 2003, enjoining the 
ESCO from, among other things, failing to properly secure consumer authorization 
to switch residential customers to its service; misrepresenting the amount, character, 
and duration of savings residential consumers could receive by switching service; 
concealing the identity of its sales agents; and failing to disclose to consumers their 
right to cancel doo-to-door sales contracts within three business days. See ECON 
Consent Judgment, supra note 107, at 6. The Order also required ECONnergy to pay 
restitution to eligible customers in the amount of $75 plus 15% of the first three 
months of their ESCO commodity service bill, and to pay $300,000 to the Attorney 
General’s Office in costs and penalties. See id. at 3-6. A similar settlement agreement 
was reached following the Attorney General’s investigation of the ESCO Total Gas 
& Electric (TG&E) in 2001. See TG&E AOD, supra note 107, at 1 ¶ 3. The Attorney 
General’s Office also entered into a settlement agreement in 2000 with Con Edison 
Solutions, an ESCO formed by the utility Consolidated Edison, following an 
investigation that revealed the ESCO was automatically renewing fixed price 
contract customers onto different contracts with new terms unless the customers 
contacted the company to opt out of the automatic renewal. See Press Release, 
Attorney General Reaches Settlement with Con Ed Solutions (June 8, 2000) (on file 
with author). In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement reached with 
the Attorney General’s Office, Con Ed Solutions sent letters out to its customers 
clearly articulating the terms of its automatic renewal policy and extended the date 
by which customers could cancel these contracts. See id. 
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York State consumers.134 Consumer complaints about ESCOs’ billing 
and marketing practices persist, despite decades of investigations and 
settlement agreements conditioning ESCOs’ ability to continue 
serving mass market customers on better training and monitoring of 
sales agents and better disclosure practices regarding pricing and 
contract terms. Complaints about misrepresented anticipated savings, 
slamming, and failure to timely process cancellation requests indicate 
that the retail access energy market in New York is not working as the 
Commission intended when it commenced the restructuring process. 
Accordingly, in October 2012, the Commission undertook a 
comprehensive review of the State’s retail markets serving residential 
and small commercial customers to address concerns over ESCOs’ 
provision of energy to such customers, particularly low-income 
consumers.135 The Commission observed: 
[c]ustomers participating in utility low-income assistance 
programs are more likely to obtain their energy commodity 
from an ESCO than residential customers who do not 
participate in these programs. Further, [Department of 
Public Service] Staff reports that some ESCOs have 
substantially more customers participating in the utility’s 
low-income assistance programs, on a percentage basis, than 
the overall population. Coupled with the fact . . . that many 
residential ESCO customers pay more than had they 
purchased their energy commodity from the utility, this 
raises a concern that the current operation of the retail energy 
markets may be in conflict with one of our statutory policy 
requirements. Specifically, it is this Commission’s policy 
that the continued provision of electric and natural gas 
service to customers is in the public interest.136  
This comprehensive review lasted for nearly two years and 
culminated with the Commission issuing an order in February 2014 
                                                                 
 134. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Reset Order, Case 15-M-0127 (Feb. 
2016). 
 135. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceeding and 
Seeking Comments Regarding Operation of the Retail Energy Markets in New York 
State, Case 12-M-0476 (Oct. 19, 2012). 
 136. See id. at 9. 
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whereby it concluded that although many ESCOs had provided large 
commercial and industrial consumers with price savings or other 
valuable products, ESCOs had not provided these same benefits to 
residential and small commercial consumers, including low-income 
consumers.137 
The Commission further determined that the retail energy market for 
residential and small commercial consumers was not functioning as 
intended; many ESCOs were simply “generating revenues by offering 
consumers little more than higher prices” and were often reaping their 
profits from low-income consumers.138 The Commission concluded 
that burdening consumers with higher ESCO prices not only harmed 
vulnerable low-income consumers but also undermined the 
effectiveness of the public-assistance programs, which were designed 
to lower overall energy bills of such consumers and decrease their 
energy burden.139 To address these harms, the Commission’s February 
2014 Order amended the UBP, requiring that ESCOs provide low-
income consumers with (1) a guarantee of “savings over what the 
customer would otherwise pay to the utility” for energy, and/or (2) 
“energy-related value-added services that are designed to reduce 
customers’ overall energy bills.”140 
The Commission later stayed implementation of its February 2014 
Order to consider petitions for rehearing and to allow for additional 
public comment on the terms conditioning ESCOs’ continued 
participation in the retail energy market for low-income consumers.141 
Following extensive input from various stakeholders, the Commission 
issued an order in February 2015 reaffirming its determination that 
ESCOs serving low-income consumers had to offer either actual 
energy price savings or energy-related products of real financial 
value.142 To effect implementation of its order, the Commission 
ordered the Department of Public Service Staff (DPS Staff) to convene 
a Collaborative by holding a series of public meetings with various 
                                                                 
 137. See id. at 10-11. 
 138. See id. at 2-4. 
 139. See id. at 22-24. 
 140. See id. at 24. 
 141. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Granting Requests for 
Rehearing and Issuing a Stay, Case 12-M-0476 (Apr. 25, 2014). 
 142. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Granting Requests for 
Rehearing and Issuing a Stay, Case 12-M-0476 (Feb. 6, 2015). 
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stakeholders, including several ESCOs and their related trade 
associations, all major New York utilities, and consumer advocates 
including the Utility Intervention Unit (UIU),143 the Public Utility Law 
Project (PULP),144 the American Association of Retired Persons 
(AARP),145 and the City of New York.146 
Following a year of meetings and discussions throughout 2015, the 
Collaborative issued an extensive report, concluding that “few, if any, 
ESCOs intend to offer a product which guarantees that the customer 
will pay no more than [he/she] would have been paid had energy been 
purchased from the utility.”147 In seeking to preserve the effectiveness 
of financial assistance programs, the Collaborative noted that any 
fixed-price product (i.e. an ESCO plan setting a fixed monthly price 
for energy measured per kilowatt hour rather than a price that 
fluctuates with the market) that ultimately charged low-income 
consumers more for energy than the utility would have charged did not 
provide low-income consumers with any real financial savings.148 
                                                                 
 143. The Utility Intervention Unit, housed within the Division of Consumer 
Protection of the New York Department of State, advocates on behalf of all New 
Yorkers in all proceedings concerning the affordability of and access to electricity 
and natural gas service. See Notice, Department of State, Division of Consumer 
Protection, Utility Intervention (Jan. 2, 2013) (on file with author). 
 144. See PUBLIC UTILITY LAW PROJECT, http://www.pulp.tc/. PULP advocates on 
behalf of low income and rural consumers on issues of affordable energy and 
telecommunications access. See id. 
 145. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS, http://www.aarp.org/
?intcmp=GLBNAV-PL-HOME-HOME. AARP is a non-profit organization 
dedicated to improving the quality of life for those 50 years of age and older. See id. 
 146. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Report of the Collaborative Regarding 
Protections for Low Income Customers of Energy Services Companies, Case 12-M-
0476, et al., at 2 (Nov. 5, 2015). 
 147. Id. at 32. 
 148. Id. at. 33. (Low-income consumers interested in price consistency are better 
served by enrolling in the utility’s budget billing program, which provides consumers 
with a flat price each month without extracting a premium for offering a fixed 
monthly price as the ESCOs charge.); see id. at 33-34. DPS Staff testified during the 
evidentiary hearings regarding its analysis of the prices ESCOs charged for fixed 
price products and found “a continuous 30% premium associated” with fixed rate 
plans; see also In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy Service Companies et 
al., Case 15-M-0127, at 2,502, Evidentiary Hearing (Dec. 6, 2017). Although one of 
the ESCOs’ expert witnesses testified that during the polar vortex, some ESCO 
customers saved 10% over utility customers in the coldest month, DPS Staff testified 
that when considering a 30% premium on average over the course of three years (the 
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While the low-income Collaborative was underway, the 
Commission was simultaneously contemplating whether to enact 
similar restrictions on ESCOs serving all mass market customers, 
namely residential customers and small commercial customers. On 
May 12, 2015, DPS Staff led a Technical Conference for all 
stakeholders to discuss rules regarding the Commission’s regulation of 
DER service providers and products insofar as those providers could 
also be ESCOs.149 The goals of the conference included obtaining 
input from all stakeholders “regarding the design, structure, and level 
of supervision of DER providers that will be appropriate to ensure 
consumer protections, while at the same time enabl[ing] markets to 
develop through fair competition.”150 The Commission also sought to 
obtain input from stakeholders regarding potential changes to the UBP 
as they would apply to ESCOs serving all mass market customers.151 
Specifically, the Commission endeavored to “increase the 
participation and benefits of residential and small non-residential 
customers and . . . reform the State’s energy industry to . . . promote 
penetration of renewable energy resources and enhance customers’ 
ability to manage their energy usage and bills.”152 
DPS Staff subsequently issued a proposal for public comment 
arising from the Technical Conference.153 Following the comment 
period on the Staff Proposal, the Commission issued an order on 
February 23, 2016 (Reset Order) that revised the UBP by declaring 
that ESCOs may only enroll mass market customers via contracts that 
                                                                 
relevant period for which all data was available to compare ESCO prices to utility 
prices from 2014-2016), “a 10% savings in one month does not compare equitably 
to three years of 30% premium.” 
 149. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice of Technical Conference, Case 
15-M-0180, et al., at 1 (Apr. 21, 2015). 
 150. Id. at 2. 
 151. Id. at 2-3. 
 152. Id. at 3. 
 153. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comments of the Joint Utilities to the Staff 
Proposal, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 1 (July 28, 2015). DPS Staff was still seeking 
comments on similar issues a year later. See N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice 
Seeking Comments, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 2 (May 10, 2016) (seeking public 
comment on three DPS Staff whitepapers: performance bonds or other means of 
demonstrating financial security for ESCOs, reference prices for ESCO products to 
allow transparent comparisons of ESCO and utility prices, and express consent from 
ESCO customers regarding contract renewals). 
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either (1) guaranteed savings compared to what the mass market 
customers would have paid as a full service utility customer, or (2) 
provided the customers with at least 30% renewably-sourced 
electricity.154 The Reset Order further tasked the Commission, in 
collaboration with various stakeholder parties, to consider imposing 
additional long-term conditions on ESCOs and their ability to serve 
mass market customers, including whether ESCOs should be required 
to post performance bonds.155 
A suite of legal challenges ensued, including challenges to the 
Commission’s jurisdiction to enact such a prohibition and procedural 
due process challenges.156 The New York State Supreme Court in 
Albany County held that the Commission had broad statutory authority 
to regulate ESCOs’ pricing practices. On appeal, the State of New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Judicial Department 
upheld this conclusion.157 However, the Appellate Division vacated 
                                                                 
 154. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets 
and Establishing Further Process, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 1-2 (Feb. 3, 2016). 
 155. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets 
and Establishing Further Process, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 20 (Feb. 23, 2016). 
Performance bonds are required in other industries to demonstrate financial 
capability. For example, contractors are often required to provide a surety bond that 
cover the costs of any labor delegated to a subcontractor. Such surety bonds act as a 
form of credit used to reimburse homeowners in the event that a claim arises out of 
the work performed; see Romualdo P. Eclavea, Contractors’ Bonds Summary 
February 2018 Update, 17 AM. JUR. 2d (Feb. 2018). Stakeholders in the retail access 
collaborative were directed to consider the magnitude of any potential bonds and 
how such bonds would be administered most efficiently. See also Reset Order, supra 
note 134, at 2. 
 156. See Nat’l Energy Marketers Ass’n et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26233, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Albany County July 22, 2016); Retail 
Energy Supply Ass’n et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., (Albany County Index 
No. 870-16); Family Energy Inc. et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., (Albany 
County Index No. 874-16), Decision/Order issued July 22, 2016 (Zwack, J); aff’d 
Matter of National Energy Marketers Ass’n. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 2017 NY Slip 
Op 05901 (July 27, 2017) and Matter of Retail Energy Supply Ass’n. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n., 2017 NY Slip Op 05908, at *7 (July 27, 2017). 
 157. See Matter of Retail Energy Supply Assn. v. Public Serv. Comm’n., 2017 NY 
Slip Op 05908, at *7 (July 27, 2017) (“In fact, it is the [Public Service Commission] 
PSC’s broad jurisdiction that enabled it to allow ESCOs access to utility systems in 
the first place. The PSC essentially maintains that this same authority allows it to 
impose limitations on ESCO rates as a condition to continued access. We agree.”). 
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certain portions of the order on due process grounds and remitted the 
matter to the Commission for further proceedings.158 
Meanwhile, after considering the low-income Collaborative Report 
and the extensive record developed over years of administrative 
proceedings, the Commission issued an order in July 2016 enacting a 
moratorium on ESCOs’ sale of energy to low-income consumers.159 
The Commission concluded that such a moratorium was necessary to 
protect low-income consumers, as ESCOs had demonstrated that they 
were either unwilling or unable to offer products to low-income 
consumers that resulted in cost savings compared to the rates charged 
by utilities.160 Through the moratorium, the Commission also sought 
to ensure that “the financial benefits provided to [low-income 
consumers] through utility low-income assistance programs are not 
absorbed by ESCOs, who in turn, provide gas and electricity at higher 
prices without corresponding value.”161 
As with the order enacting limitations on ESCOs service to mass 
market customers, a series of legal challenges ensued following the 
Commission’s moratorium on low-income service. After two ESCO 
trade associations, Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA) and 
National Energy Marketers Association (NEMA), petitioned for a 
rehearing of the July 2016 Order, the Commission reaffirmed its 
determination in a September 2016 Order. The September 2016 Order 
found that a moratorium was necessary because the Collaborative 
proceedings had made clear that ESCOs would not be able to provide 
price guarantees or valuable energy products to low-income 
consumers “anytime in the near future.”162 NEMA, BlueRock Energy, 
Inc., Residents Energy, LLC and Verde Energy USA New York, LCC 
(collectively NEMA) and RESA then filed lawsuits seeking a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a permanent injunction of the 
                                                                 
 158. Nat’l Energy Marketers Ass’n et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., at *9; 
aff’d in part, Matter of Nat’l Energy Marketers Ass’n. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 2017 
NY Slip Op 05901 (July 27, 2017); Matter of Retail Energy Supply Ass’n. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n., 2017 NY Slip Op 05908, at * 8-9 (July 27, 2017). 
 159. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Regarding the Provision of Service 
to Low-Income Customers by Energy Service Companies, Case 12-M-0476 et al., at 
17-18 (July 15, 2016). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 10. 
 162. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order on Rehearing and Providing 
Clarification, Case 12-M-0476 et al., at 14 (Sept. 19, 2016). 
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Commission’s July 2016 and September 2016 Orders. On September 
28, 2016, the Albany County Supreme Court granted the TRO, 
preventing the implementation of the Commission’s July and 
September Orders until further order from the Court.163 
The next month, the Commission published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in the State Register to advise the public that it was 
considering modifying the July 2016 and September 2016 Orders.164 
Following a full statutory notice and comment period, the Commission 
issued an order in December 2016, reaffirming the necessity of the 
protections provided in the July 2016 and September 2016 Orders.165 
The December 2016 Order thus converted the moratorium in the July 
2016 and September 2016 Orders into a permanent prohibition on 
ESCO service to low-income consumers by prohibiting ESCOs from 
enrolling new low-income consumers or renewing the contracts of 
existing low-income consumers.166 The Commission explained that an 
immediate prohibition on ESCO service to low-income consumers was 
necessary to protect consumers from abusive conduct and to protect 
the taxpayers and other ratepayers who fund the energy assistance 
program subsidies to low-income consumers.167 However, the 
December 2016 Order permitted ESCOs willing or able to guarantee 
savings to low-income consumers to seek a waiver from the general 
prohibition on providing service to mass market customers.168 Finally, 
                                                                 
 163. Nat’l. Energy Marketers Assn. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 60 N.Y.S. 
760, 764-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 164. See 38 N.Y. Reg. 16 (Oct. 5, 2016). 
 165. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the 
Commission to Assess Certain Aspects of the Residential and Small Non-Residential 
Retail Energy Markets in New York State, Case 12-M-0476 et al., at 3 (issued Dec. 
16, 2016). 
 166. Id. at 19. 
 167. Id. at 9. 
 168. Id. at 23-34. The Commission explained that it would consider granting a 
waiver if an ESCO could demonstrate (a) an ability to calculate what the customer 
would have paid to the utility; (b) a willingness and ability to ensure that the customer 
would pay no more than what would have been owed to the utility; and (c) 
appropriate reporting and an ability to verify compliance with these requirements. 
See id. To date, four ESCOs have successfully petitioned for a waiver of the 
prohibition and is permitted to provide commodity service to participants in utility 
low-income assistance programs. Id. at 4 (finding that M&R failed to provide 
sufficient details regarding its price calculations and failed to report any 
demonstrated guaranteed savings); see also id. (finding that Drift failed to provide 
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the Commission noted that it would continue pursuing reforms for 
mass market customers and acknowledged the possibility that 
successfully resolving issues in the energy retail market could 
eventually obviate the need for any prohibition on ESCO service in the 
future.169 
NEMA and RESA amended their petition to challenge the 
December 2016 Order, in addition to the July and September 2016 
Orders. The Albany County Supreme Court dismissed this petition on 
June 30, 2017.170 The court first noted that it had previously 
determined that the Commission had authority to regulate ESCOs.171 
The court then held that the Commission’s findings regarding low-
income energy customers were rational and supported by the record.172 
Notably, the court rejected as unsupported the ESCOs’ contention that 
“there is value in the different products ESCOs offer . . . the gift cards 
ESCOs offer a low-income rate payer are actually paid for by the 
ratepayer through the [Home Energy Assistance Program] HEAP 
assistance, and hardly meet an energy need.”173 The Court went on to 
note that ESCOs’ fixed price plans did not constitute a unique, value-
added service because the utilities “always had to offer fixed rate 
billing” through their budget programs.174 
The Commission’s low-income prohibition was set for 
implementation in fall 2017, but legal challenges still abound. 175 In 
                                                                 
the requisite calculations to demonstrate how it would ensure a lower price than the 
utilities and was unable to report on its proposed guaranteed savings plan offering); 
id. at 5-6 (finding after a review of Ambit’s documents and calculations that it 
adequately demonstrated it could provide 1% savings to customers through its 
Guaranteed Savings Plan and that if no savings occur, Ambit would issue a refund 
check to the customer). 
 169. See Order Adopting a Prohibition on Service to Low-income Customers by 
Energy Service Companies, supra note 164, at 3. 
 170. Nat’l. Energy Marketers Assn., 60 N.Y.S. at 765. 
 171. Id. at 768. 
 172. Id. at 772-73 (reasoning the Commission’s findings were “well written, 
exceptionally comprehensive, address all of petitioners’ arguments, and are well 
supported by the record”). 
 173. Id. at 774. 
 174. Id. 
 175. The ESCOs have appealed Judge Zwack’s June 2017 order upholding the 
Commission’s moratorium on ESCOs serving low-income customers granting leave 
for appeal. Nat’l. Energy Marketers Assn. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., Motion 
No. 2018-100, 2018 N.Y. LEXIS 495, at *1 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (granting leave to 
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March 2018, the New York Court of Appeals granted the motions of 
RESA and NEMA seeking leave to appeal from the Third 
Department’s decision upholding the Commission’s jurisdiction to 
regulate ESCOs.176 In the meantime, the Commission continues its 
consideration of whether to enact a prohibition on ESCO service to 
mass market customers and/or what other market reforms are needed 
in this sector of the retail energy market. An evidentiary hearing on 
this matter occurred before two administrative law judges in 
November 2017 and December 2017, and post hearing briefs on the 
issues were filed in April and May 2018.177 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
As is clear from the history of these proceedings, the Commission 
has been unable to correct the market abuses that persist after New 
                                                                 
appeal). Meanwhile, a private plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit against 
the Commission in the Federal District Court of the Norther District, alleging various 
statutory and constitutional challenges to the Commission’s moratorium on ESCO 
service for low-income customers. The Northern District Court denied the plaintiff’s 
motion for a TRO staying the Commission’s Low-Income Moratorium and rejected 
plaintiff’s request that the court deny her motion for a preliminary injunction so that 
she could appeal. Plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit anyway and requested a 
TRO. Judge Cabranes entered a temporary stay of the Commission’s Order until a 
full motions panel could hear and decide the motion. If the Second Circuit denies 
plaintiff’s TRO request, the case will be remanded back to the district court where 
the Commission’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction remain pending. 
 176. See Matter of Retail Energy Supply v. New York State Public Service 
Commission, 152 A.D.3d 1133 (3d Dep’t July 27, 2017) appeal docketed, No. 2018-
99 (Mar. 27, 2018); Matter of National Energy Marketers Assn. v New York State 
Public Service Commission, 152 A.D.3d 1122 (3d Dep’t July 27, 2017) appeal 
docketed, No. 2018-99 (Mar. 27, 2018). Briefs are due in May and July 2018, with 
oral argument occurring in the fall of 2018. 
 177. See Case 15-M-0127, et al. See also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice 
Seeking Comments on Revisions to the Uniform Business Practice (Mar. 8, 2017) 
(The Commission is also considering what revisions should be made to the UBP to 
address current problems in the market to: (1) incorporate protections to prevent 
early termination or cancelation fees in the event of energy account holders death 
before the end of the contract term; (2) eliminate the appearance of an ESCO 
representative’s full name on the identification badge worn by the marketer while 
soliciting to potential customers; and (3) other related matters and housekeeping 
items). 
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York restructured its energy industry. Investigations into various 
ESCOs and settlement agreements negotiated with the Attorney 
General’s Office have not eradicated market abuses, and neither have 
various revisions to the UBP. Thus, unless or until the current abuses 
in the ESCO retail energy market are eliminated, ESCOs should be 
prohibited from offering products to mass market consumers that do 
not either guarantee savings or guarantee a value-added service in the 
form of renewable energy generation and sourcing that is sufficient to 
offset the premium paid to the ESCOs. The volume of customer 
complaints is further demonstration of the retail energy market’s 
failure. As such, a strong regulatory response targeted to remedying 
the causes of such complaints is necessary.178 This targeted response 
should consist of a prohibition on ESCOs serving all mass market 
customers with procedures enacted for ESCOs to seek a waiver from 
this prohibition if they can demonstrate: (1) guaranteed savings below 
the default utility price or (2) additional value provided from 
renewably sourced energy in excess of what the current renewable 
utility mix already provides.179 In addition, reforms still must be made 
to the UBP and should consist of amending the section pertaining to 
contract renewals and material changes. Notably, any regulatory 
measure is only as strong as its enforcement. Therefore, the 
Commission should monitor the market for compliance and enforce 
the UBP through the imposition of penalties and other fines where 
necessary. 
A. The Commission has Jurisdiction to Enact a Prohibition on 
Mass Market Service 
As a preliminary matter, the Commission possesses jurisdiction to 
issue a prohibition or otherwise condition the ability of ESCOs to serve 
mass market consumers. Article 1 of the Public Service Law grants the 
Commission broad statutory authority to regulate ESCOs: 
                                                                 
 178. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets 
and Establishing Further Process Case 12-M-0476, at 12 (Feb. 23, 2016) (finding an 
increase in abuses in the ESCO market and customer complaints despite repeated 
modifications to the UBP to strengthen consumer protections). 
 179. See DPS Staff Direct Panel Testimony, supra note 167, at 71 (discussing 
current utility generation mixes comprised of almost 30% renewable sources). 
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[t]he jurisdiction, supervision, powers and duties of the 
public service commission shall extend . . . [t]o the 
manufacture, conveying, transportation, sale or distribution 
of . . . electricity for light, heat or power . . . to electric plants 
and to the persons or corporations owning, leasing or 
operating the same.180  
The Commission’s regulatory authority encompasses ESCOs as 
entities selling energy to New York consumers.181 To exercise this 
authority, the legislature granted the Commission not only specifically 
enumerated duties but “also all powers necessary or proper to enable 
[the Commission] to carry out the purposes” of the Public Service 
Law.182 
Article 1, Section 5 further mandates that the Commission, “shall 
encourage all persons and corporations subject to its jurisdiction to 
formulate and carry out long-range programs, individually or 
cooperatively, for the performance of their public service 
responsibilities with economy, efficiency, and care for the public 
safety, the preservation of environmental values and the conservation 
of natural resources.”183 Section 5 is broad enough to encompass 
Commission oversight of ESCOs as necessary to promote the values 
of economy, efficiency, and public safety.184 Given that the REV 
initiative has the goal of promoting clean energy through the 
development and deployment of DERs,185 Article 1, Section 5 of the 
Public Service Law requires Commission oversight of any new 
markets and programs in which ESCOs choose to participate as DER 
                                                                 
 180. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 5(1)(b) (2018). 
 181. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting ESCO Price Reporting 
Requirements And Enforcement Mechanisms Case 06-M-0647, at 10 (Nov. 8, 2006) 
(applying price-reporting requirements to ESCOs pursuant to article 1 authority); see 
also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Amendments to the Uniform 
Business Practices, Granting in Part Petition on Behalf of Customers and Rejecting 
National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation’s Tariff Filing Case 98-M-1343, at 10 
(Oct. 27, 2008) (explaining that the Commission has “well-understood jurisdiction 
over ESCOs and their marketing practices” under Article 1). 
 182. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 4(1). 
 183. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 5(2) (emphasis added). 
 184. Shall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 185. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceeding Case 14-
M-0101 (Apr. 25, 2014). 
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suppliers186 to ensure the adequate “performance of their public service 
responsibilities.”187 
In addition, the Commission has authority under Article 4 of the 
Public Service Law to regulate the terms and conditions by which 
ESCOs are permitted to access public utility infrastructure to sell 
energy to consumers.188 The Commission exercised these statutory 
powers when it restructured the retail access energy market, requiring 
that public utilities permit ESCOs to access the utilities’ distribution 
systems.189 The Commission necessarily retained this same discretion 
to alter the terms and conditions of ESCOs’ access to the distribution 
system in the future.190 Articles 1 and 4 of the Public Service Law vest 
the Commission with continuing supervision over the restructured 
market created to ensure that competition provides consumers with 
lower energy prices and valuable energy products.191 
Article 2, Section 53 of the Public Service Law also provides 
authority for the Commission’s jurisdiction, as ESCOs fall within the 
definition of an entity that “sells or facilitates the sale or furnishing 
of . . . electricity to residential customers.”192 Article 2 of the Public 
Service Law contains the Home Energy Fair Practices (HEFPA) 
provisions, which impose legislatively mandated rules relating to 
energy service for residential consumers who could suffer great harm 
if their service is terminated due to nonpayment of energy bills.193 
                                                                 
 186. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy 
Framework and Implementation Plan Case 14-M-0101 (issued Feb. 26, 2015) 
(“Framework Order”). 
 187. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 5(2). 
 188. See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 4(1), 5(1)(b), 66, 66-d. 
 189. See also Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 119 A.D.2d 353, 
354-56 (3d Dep’t 1986). 
 190. See Campo Corp. v. Feinberg, 279 A.D. 302, 305-07 (3d Dep’t 1952) 
(reasoning that the Commission possessed authority under Article 4 to regulate 
access to public-utility service and ban nonutility landlords from engaging in practice 
of submetering); see also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Statement of Policy on 
Further Steps Toward Competition in Retail Energy Markets, Case 00-M-0504, at 
18 (Aug. 25, 2004) (reiterating the Commission’s “regulatory involvement [should] 
be tailored to reflect the competitiveness of the market”). 
 191. See Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 71 N.Y.2d 313, 320-22 
(1988); see also Energy Ass’n v. PSC, 169 Misc. 2d 924, 932-35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1996). 
 192. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 53. 
 193. See PSL § 30 
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When HEFPA was first passed and incorporated into the Public 
Service Law in 1981, the Commission found that HEFPA did not apply 
to ESCOs because utilities remained the provider of last resort for 
consumers and ESCOs did not have authority to terminate consumers’ 
energy service.194 Subsequent to the Commission’s finding, the 
legislature amended Article 2 in 2002 to both apply HEFPA’s 
requirements to ESCOs and to afford ESCOs the ability to suspend 
residential consumers’ energy service.195 However, this Article 2 
amendment left unaltered the Commission’s jurisdiction over ESCOs 
in Articles 1 and 4 of the Public Service Law. Thus, the Article 2 
amendment merely created a floor of legislatively mandated consumer 
protections that the Commission must maintain for all residential 
consumers irrespective of whether those consumers obtain their energy 
service from an ESCO or a regulated utility.196 
A central tenet of statutory interpretation advises the reader not to 
“be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to 
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”197 Here, 
the entirety of the Public Service Law guarantees that all members of 
the public receive safe and reliable access to electricity. When the 
Commission created new markets and programs to allow ESCOs 
access to the grid to serve the retail market, it had authority to 
“introduce competition into a monopolistic marketplace and thus 
lower prices to consumers.”198 
It is therefore axiomatic that the Commission similarly has authority 
to regulate how ESCOs operate and ensure they serve the public 
interest in these new markets and programs. Accordingly, enactment 
of a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass market customers would be a 
proper exercise of authority insofar as the prohibition would protect 
consumers from the current predatory business practices ESCOs 
employ and ensure that the retail market operates fairly. If the 
                                                                 
 194. See Op. 97-5, at 22-24; see also N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law Art. 2, §§30-52. 
 195. See Ch. 686, § 2, 2002 N.Y. Laws 3657, 3657-61; see also Mem. of State 
Consumer Protection Board, reprinted in Bill Jacket for Ch. 686, at 9-10(2002) 
[hereinafter CPB Mem.]; N.Y. Pub. Serv. L. Art. 2 § 30; 16 NYCRR § 11.1. 
 196. See CPB Mem., supra note 194, at 9-10. 
 197. United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850). 
 198. Energy Ass’n of New York State v. Public Serv. Comm’n of the State of New 
York, 169 Misc. 2d 924 (Albany County Sup. Ct. 1996) (citing CNG Transmission 
Corp. v. New York State Public Serv. Comm’n, 185 A.D.2d 671 (4th Dep’t. 1992)). 
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Commission chose to prohibit ESCOs from serving mass market 
customers, it would be carrying out its fundamental purpose of 
ensuring that energy resources remain affordable to the public.199 
B. A Prohibition on Mass Market Service is Appropriate 
During discovery and the submission of testimony in the fall of 2017 
and through the end of the evidentiary hearings concluding in 
December 2017, various parties have proposed that the Commission 
prohibit ESCOs from serving mass market customers if ESCOs cannot 
offer consumers guaranteed savings. While many ESCOs seek to 
perpetuate the status quo, others propose enacting various bans on 
ESCO service, including the DPS Staff, UIU, the New York Attorney 
General’s Office, and PULP.200 The ultimate issue in these 
proceedings is how to regulate the retail access market so that 
consumers receive lower energy prices, additional valuable energy 
products, and renewable energy options. Even one of the ESCO’s own 
experts conceded that some action is warranted and that the 
Commission was correct when it noted that “[w]hile a well-designed 
market could offer these consumer opportunities, it simply does not 
exist today.” Of the many proposals contemplated in these 
proceedings, the DPS Staff’s proposal has the most merit and should 
be adopted by the Commission. Nevertheless, the proposal would 
benefit from further refinements. 
                                                                 
 199. See Matter of Energy Ass’n, 169 Misc. 2d 924, 927-32 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
County 1996). 
 200. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, DPS Staff Panel Direct Testimony, at 
20-21 Case 15-M-0127 (Sept. 15, 2017); see also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
UIU/NYAG Panel Direct Testimony Case 15-M-0127, at 22 (Sept. 15, 2017); State 
of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Barbara Alexander Direct Testimony on behalf of 
PULP Case 15-M-0127, at 72 (Sept. 15, 2017). Although not a party to these 
proceedings, AARP responded to the questions the Commission sought to answer in 
these proceedings, especially the question of whether ESCOs should be prohibited 
in total or in part from serving mass market customers. In response to that question, 
AARP answered that “ESCOs should not supply mass-market customers if it cannot 
be shown that they are matching or beating the customer’s incumbent utility price.” 
State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Responses of AARP to Commission Questions, 
Case 15-M-0127, at 1-2 (Sept. 15, 2017). 
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1. The DPS Staff’s Proposal: A Good Starting Place 
The primary reason residential consumers elect to take commodity 
service from an ESCO is the belief that they will save money on their 
energy rates compared to what the default utility offers. A secondary 
reason residential consumers choose to obtain commodity service from 
an ESCO is if they are assured of receiving a green energy product.201 
Mindful of these motivations, in September 2017 the DPS Staff 
proposed that the Commission prohibit ESCOs from serving mass 
market consumers unless ESCOs can provide customers with: (1) 
guaranteed savings below the default service utility price, (2) 100% 
renewably-sourced products, or (3) community choice aggregation 
options.202 DPS Staff recommend that: 
except for instances where an ESCO is willing and able to 
provide a durable guaranteed savings when measured 
against the default utility service, where an ESCO is willing 
and able to provide a value-added electric commodity 
renewable resource energy product where 100% of the 
electricity provided each calendar year was generated from 
renewable resources, or in the context of community choice 
aggregation, the retail access market for mass market 
customers should be shut down.203  
DPS Staff recommend that the Commission prohibits ESCOs from 
enrolling any new mass market customers and that current mass 
market customers be transitioned back to default utility service as 
                                                                 
 201. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing Case 15-M-0127, 
at 2,206-08 (Dec. 5, 2017) (DPS Staff Policy Panel testifying on the topic of 
consumer choice in the New York energy market). 
 202. See id. at 20-21. Staff noted that, based on data received thus far, the 
community choice aggregation model provided a potential pathway for ESCOs to 
serve mass market customers and lower prices that those set by the default utility by 
“maximizing the economies of scale and benefits,” especially where the aggregator 
could “fully evaluate competing ESCO supply offers.” Id. at 130. Staff noted that 
community choice aggregation models were still in their infancy in New York and 
that while such models held potential, they still required monitoring and supervision. 
See id. at 128-30. A full discussion and analysis of community choice aggregation 
models is outside the scope of this article. 
 203. Id. at 21. 
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existing contracts with ESCOs expire.204 Thus, the DPS Staff’s 
proposal essentially creates a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass 
market customers with three limited exceptions to the general 
prohibition. The second of these limited exceptions – the provision of 
100% renewably sourced energy – was included in recognition of 
Governor Cuomo’s “strategy to lead on climate change and grow New 
York’s economy by building a cleaner, more resilient and affordable 
energy system for all New Yorkers . . . by stimulating investment in 
clean technologies like solar, wind, and energy efficiency.”205 DPS 
Staff further recognized that the governor’s REV initiative was 
working “to ensure that New York State reduces its statewide 
greenhouse gas emissions forty percent by 2030 and achieves the 
internationally-recognized target of reducing emissions eighty percent 
by 2050.”206 Accordingly, DPS Staff fashioned a solution to the ESCO 
market problem that still allows for New Yorkers to participate in the 
REV initiative by “securing 100% renewable commodity contracts” if 
ESCOs are willing and able to provide them. The DPS Staff noted that 
such products “will likely come at a premium to the traditional 
utilities’ rate offerings” and that perhaps ESCOs could compete in this 
niche renewable market space to provide the lower prices and value 
the Commission had originally envisioned when it first restructured 
the state’s energy market.207 Under the DPS Staff’s proposal, any 
ESCO offering such a product must guarantee that 100% of the energy 
provided is derived from biomass, biogas, hydropower, solar, or 
wind.208 As part of monitoring the 100% renewably-sourced exception 
to the general prohibition on ESCOs serving the mass market, DPS 
Staff also recommended that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the 
                                                                 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 70. 
 206. See id. at 71. 
 207. See id. Staff further explained that it set the renewable generation requirement 
at 100% because some utility service territories already provide a generation mix 
consisting of approximately 30% renewables and “that the bar for ESCO products 
should be set higher.” Id. Staff also recommended that any prices the ESCOs charged 
for 100% sourced renewable products be revisited in a Track II proceeding to ensure 
that the premiums charged provided “reasonable value to the customers in relation 
to the cost of supplying such products.” Id. at 74. 
 208. See DPS Staff Panel Direct Testimony, supra note 199, at 73. Such a 
guarantee is also subject to the definitions and other provisions and delivery rules of 
the Commission’s Environmental Disclosure Program. 
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ESCO annually file and certify with the Commission that all mass 
market enrollments and contracts adhere to the Commission’s 
Environmental Disclosure Program regarding environmental attributes 
of the energy generation and attendant delivery rules.209 
2. Refining the DPS Staff’s Proposal: Additional Enhancements 
Are Necessary 
The September 2017 DPS Staff proposal is laudable for many 
reasons. Weeks of evidentiary hearings on the proposal in November 
and December 2017 revealed that the current system of regulation and 
the existing UBP are not sufficient to protect mass market consumers 
from continued abusive ESCO marketing behavior, and the ESCOs 
have thus far appeared largely unwilling to amend their business 
practices in the absence of an Attorney General’s investigation. 
Multiple ESCOs testified during the hearings that they lack any kind 
of customer service evaluation or monitoring system to ensure and 
demonstrate compliance with the existing UBP.210 Multiple ESCOs 
were also unable to testify during the hearings as to the kind of value-
added services they currently offer to consumers to justify the 
commodity service price differences compared to the default utility.211 
                                                                 
 209. Id. at 74. Failure to certify or maintain specific records available for auditing 
purposes would result in the disqualification of the ESCO’s eligibility to provide 
“any services to any customers in New York State.” Id. 
 210. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, 
at 136 (Nov. 29, 2017) (Great Eastern Energy’s expert Ronald Lukas testifying that 
he could not explain in detail how the ESCO monitored compliance with the UBP 
and he could not opine on what would be “too frequent” an occurrence of UBP 
violations before the company would consider changing its business practices). 
 211. See id. at 195 (Direct Energy’s expert Michael Kagan testifying that he was 
unable to provide with particularity any value-added products or green products 
Direct Energy currently offered New York residential consumers to justify the 
differences in commodity price between the ESCO and the utilities); see also id. at 
550 (Direct Energy’s expert witness Dr. John R. Morris admitting, when asked 
whether his analysis included any quantifiable data to support his assertion that 
ESCO energy supply products are distinguishable from the utilities’ supply products, 
that the “value is largely not quantifiable”); id. at 756 (NEMA’s expert witness Dr. 
Jeff Makholm admitting that he could not identify any ESCOs in New York that are 
providing energy commodities generated by renewable sources at a higher rate than 
utilities). 
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One ESCO president testified that he offers his customers a bundled, 
package deal including boiler service, LED lightbulbs, and electricity 
at a fixed price per kilowatt hour consumed. However, because the 
bundled services are billed together, he admitted that “customers 
wouldn’t have any way of knowing how much they were paying for 
commodity service, versus the LED lightbulbs, versus the boiler 
maintenance” service.212 
The UIU/NYAG Expert Panel testified that after a review of all the 
discovery generated in the case, they “did not see sufficient 
quantitative evidence that would explain the observed price disparity 
between ESCO and Utility products.”213 Despite the lack of evidence 
demonstrating ESCOs were providing additional value to consumers 
in their product offerings that justified higher prices than utility 
products, one ESCO expert opined that “[t]here should not be price 
regulation. There should not be a limit” and that ESCOs should “be 
allowed to charge what the market will bear.”214 Given these realities, 
the DPS Staff’s proposal balances the need for enhanced consumer 
protections while recognizing that ESCOs may still have a role to play 
in providing renewable energy as part of the REV initiative. However, 
a few refinements and additional regulatory reforms would enhance 
the consumer protections presented in the current proposal. 
a. The Procedure for a Written Waiver Process Should be Explicitly 
Articulated in the UBP 
To the extent that the Commission adopts aspects of the DPS Staff’s 
proposal and enacts a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass market 
customers, the Commission should also explicitly articulate a written 
waiver process ESCOs may follow if they believe they can meet the 
above-stated criteria (i.e. price savings compared to the default utility 
service, 100% renewably-sourced generation, or community choice 
                                                                 
 212. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at 
4,046 (Dec. 12, 2017) (IEC’s expert witness and president of Brown’s Energy 
Services, LLC Michael Palmese testifying regarding his business model and pricing 
plans). 
 213. See e.g. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-
0127, at 1,938 (Dec. 4, 2017). 
 214. See e.g. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-
0127, at 1,405 (Dec. 1, 2017) (cross-examination of RESA’s expert Mr. Frank 
Lacey). 
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aggregation). Such a waiver process should be clearly explained in a 
revised version of the UBP. Delineating the steps to securing a waiver 
would clarify the conditions under which such service may be allowed 
to mass market consumers. To that end, the waiver process should 
include, at a minimum, a requirement that ESCOs file their waiver 
petitions and discovery requests or responses on the New York State 
Department of Public Service’s Document and Management Master 
(DMM) system.215 The waiver process should also include the 
opportunity for public comment, the filing and submission of which 
would be available on the DMM site. Finally, the Commission should 
set forth in the UBP what its review and approval process will be for 
deeming an ESCO eligible to serve mass market customers. Such a 
review should be conducted annually to ensure any ESCO serving 
mass market customers continues complying with all local, state, and 
federal laws. In the event an ESCO violates any of the terms of the 
UBP, the Commission should pursue appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms, including revocation of the ESCO’s eligibility to serve 
mass market customers. 
b. The UBP Contract Renewal Provisions Should be Amended 
In addition to amending the UBP to include a written waiver process 
for ESCOs seeking to serve mass market customers, the UBP should 
also be revised with respect to Section 5(B)(5)(d), the provision 
pertaining to material changes and contract renewals. Presently, this 
provision of the UBP provides that: 
no material changes shall be made in the terms or duration 
of any contract for the provision of energy by an ESCO 
without the express consent of the customer obtained under 
the methods authorized in the UBP. This shall not restrict an 
ESCO from renewing a contract by clearly informing the 
customer in writing, not less than thirty days nor more than 
sixty days prior to the renewal date, of the renewal terms and 
the customer’s option to reject the renewal terms. A 
customer shall not be charged a termination fee as set forth 
in Section 5.B.3.1.a herein, if the customer objects to such 
                                                                 
 215. See Why Become a Registered User of the Document and Matter 
Management (DMM) System?, N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., www.dps.ny.gov. 
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renewal within three business days of receipt of the first 
billing statement under the agreement as renewed. 
Regarding contract renewals, with the exception of a rate 
change, or an initial sales agreement that specifies that the 
agreement renews on a monthly basis with a variable rate 
methodology which was specified in the initial sales 
agreement, all changes will be considered material and will 
require that the ESCO obtain the customer’s express consent 
for renewal.216  
DPS Staff did not recommend revising any of the above language in 
the UBP in its September 2017 proposal.217 As currently written, this 
language essentially allows ESCOs to re-enroll customers at the 
expiration of a fixed rate plan to a higher priced month to month 
variable plan without obtaining customers’ express consent to renew a 
contractual relationship with the ESCO under different terms than the 
original contract.218 
Section 5(B)(5)(d) of the UBP states that “no material changes shall 
be made in the terms or duration of any contract for the provision of 
energy by an ESCO without the express consent of the customer . . . 
with the exception of a rate change. . . .” The language is ambiguous 
because it is unclear whether switching a customer from a fixed rate 
contract to a variable rate contract at the time of renewal is a material 
contract change that would require express customer consent, or 
whether this switching constitutes a “rate change” that is exempt from 
the express consent requirement. The term “rate change” is not defined 
within the definitions section of the UBP.219 Thus, a definition of “rate 
change” should be added to Section 1 of the UBP to expressly indicate 
that switching a customer from a fixed price contract to a variable 
                                                                 
 216. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-M-
1343, at 27 (Feb. 2016). 
 217. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, UBP Redline, Case 15-M-0127 (Sept. 
15, 2017). 
 218. PULP refers to this situation as a “negative option renewal process” and 
explains that such a process impacts a significant number of customers who “do not 
understand they their prices have changed or why the ESCO can make such a 
change.” See Barbara Alexander Direct Testimony supra note 199, at 62. 
 219. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-
M-1343, at 1-5 (2015). 
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priced contract at the time of renewal is not a rate change, but rather a 
material change that requires a customer’s express consent. 
Alternatively, the UBP could be revised to expressly indicate that 
switching a customer from a fixed price contract to a variable price 
contract at the time of renewal constitutes a “billing option.” Section 5 
applies only to material changes to a contract and renewals but not 
“changing billing options.”220 As such, were a switch from a fixed 
price contract to a variable price contract to be considered a “billing 
option” and not a “rate change,” the exception to obtaining express 
customer consent would not be available. 
Whichever revision is ultimately enacted, the Commission should 
clarify whether it interprets the term “rate change” as encompassing 
the situation described above – namely, an ESCO switching a customer 
from a fixed rate contract to a variable rate contract at the time of 
renewal. If such a switch is considered a “rate change,” then express 
customer consent is not required under the current rules. However, 
switching a customer from a fixed price plan to a variable price plan 
arguably constitutes a material contract change (and not merely a rate 
change) such that express customer consent should be required. 
In addition to stating that rate changes are an exception to the general 
rule that all material changes to a contract require express customer 
consent, Section 5(B)(5)(d) of the UBP also provides that express 
consent is not required for “an initial sales agreement that specifies that 
the agreement renews on a monthly basis with a variable rate 
methodology which was specified in the initial sales agreement.” 
Parties to the ESCO retail access proceedings have presented evidence 
that many ESCO contracts do not properly disclose the “variable rate 
methodology” employed when setting residential or small commercial 
rates and that consumers fail to understand these nuances in billing 
rates.221 Accordingly, this exception to obtaining express customer 
consent should also be eliminated from the UBP. 
                                                                 
 220. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-
M-1343, at Section 5(A) (2015) (stating “This Section does not establish practices 
for obtaining other energy-related services or changing billing options.”). 
 221. See e.g., Barbara Alexander Direct Testimony, supra note 199, at 62 
(explaining that, based on her analysis, “most of the ESCO contractual terms do not 
properly disclose the ‘variable rate methodology,’ as required by the UBP, in a 
manner that would allow any customer to either understand the basis for the resulting 
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C. A Prohibition on Mass Market Marketing Would Likely Pass 
Constitutional Muster 
If the Commission decided not to adopt the DPS Staff September 
2017 proposal in full and instead only prohibited ESCOs from 
engaging in door-to-door marketing and telemarketing to residential 
customers, such a ban would nonetheless assist in providing much-
needed additional consumer protections to the retail energy market 
space. If the Commission proceeded to enact such a ban on marketing, 
it is almost certain that the ESCOs would challenge the ban and seek 
to strike it down as an unconstitutional restriction on free speech under 
the First Amendment.222 However, it is doubtful whether any such 
legal challenge would succeed. Where, as here, the record 
demonstrates that lesser restrictions have not been sufficient to achieve 
the asserted governmental interest advanced by the restriction on 
commercial speech, there is a colorable argument that a total ban in the 
form of a prohibition on door-to-door and telephonic marketing is 
necessary. 
During the November and December 2017 evidentiary hearings, an 
ESCO named Infinite Energy claimed that any ban on ESCO door-to-
door and/or telephonic marketing service to residential customers 
would violate the First Amendment.223 Infinite Energy relied on 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission of New York224 to support its constitutional argument. 
However, Central Hudson is distinguishable from the instant case. In 
Central Hudson, the issue was whether the Commission could impose 
a regulation banning an electric utility from advertising to promote the 
use of electricity.225 In December 1973, the Commission ordered New 
York utilities to cease all advertising that promoted the use of 
electricity when it became apparent that the state had insufficient fuel 
stocks to continue meeting consumer demand throughout the 1973-
1974 winter.226 When the fuel shortage eased three years later, the 
                                                                 
rate or determine whether the resulting rate conformed to the stated methodology in 
the terms and conditions”). 
 222. See Infinite Energy, Inc. d/b/a Intelligent Energy Ex., DC-1 (Oct. 27, 2017). 
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 224. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
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 226. See id. at 558-59. 
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Commission sought public comment on whether the ban on utility 
promotional advertising should continue.227 Central Hudson opposed 
the ban, claiming it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.228 
The trial court and intermediate appellate court upheld the 
Commission’s order, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, 
concluding that the governmental interest in the advertising ban 
outweighed the constitutional value of the commercial speech.229 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed.230 The Court 
noted that the Constitution affords less protection to commercial 
speech than other forms of expression and that such protection “turns 
on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests 
served by its regulation.”231 The Court began its analysis by noting that 
the government was permitted to ban forms of communication that 
were “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”232 Where 
the communication is not misleading, the government must assert a 
substantial interest that would be achieved by restricting the 
commercial speech. Whether the restriction serves a substantial 
interest turns on two criteria: (1) whether the restriction directly 
advances the governmental interest involved, and (2) whether the 
governmental interest could be served by lesser restrictions on the 
commercial speech.233 Restraints that only indirectly advance the 
governmental interest involved or that are not narrowly drawn are 
impermissible.234 Accordingly, Central Hudson established a four-part 
analysis when commercial speech is at issue: 
1. Whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading (thus demanding First Amendment protections); 
2. Whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; 
3. Whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted; 
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4. Whether the restriction is not more extensive than 
necessary to serve that interest.235  
In Central Hudson the Court found that advertisements by utilities 
and unregulated firms are protected commercial speech, absent 
extraordinary conditions, thus satisfying the first prong.236 The Court 
further found that the second prong was met because the State’s 
expressed interest in maintaining fair and efficient rates was a clear 
and substantial governmental interest.237 While the Court deemed the 
link between the advertising prohibition and the utility’s rate structure 
tenuous “at most,” it determined that a direct link existed between the 
state’s interest in fuel conservation and the Commission’s order, 
thereby satisfying the third prong.238 Central Hudson, therefore, turned 
on the fourth prong of the analysis. The Court ruled that “no showing 
has been made that a more limited restriction on the content of 
promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State’s 
interests.”239 As such, the State’s regulation could not be upheld. 
In the current proceedings, if the Commission ultimately chooses to 
accept the DPS Staff’s proposal to prohibit ESCOs from engaging in 
door-to-door sales and telemarketing to residential customers, a legal 
challenge to the Commission’s adoption of the proposal would likely 
focus on whether restrictions on advertising are permissible under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Using the four-part analysis set 
forth in Central Hudson, such a ban is likely to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. 
First, given the record in the recent proceedings, a court may 
conclude that the ESCOs fail to satisfy the first prong of the Central 
Hudson analysis insofar as the ESCOs’ marketing practices are 
deceptive and misleading, thereby warranting no constitutional 
protection under the First Amendment. If a court agrees with that 
premise, the analysis would end, and the ban would be upheld. If a 
court disagreed and found that ESCOs’ marketing was constitutionally 
protected speech, the court would then likely conclude that the asserted 
governmental interest – providing affordable energy prices for 
                                                                 
 235. Id. at 567. 
 236. See id. at 567-68 
 237. Id. at 569. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 570. 
400 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
consumers – is substantial pursuant to the reasoning stated in Central 
Hudson. Under the third prong, regulation in the form of a ban on door-
to-door and/or telephonic marketing directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted because ESCO marketing leads 
consumers to pay significantly higher rates for commodity service than 
the default utility service charges. Fourth and finally, there is a valid 
argument that a total ban on such marketing practices is required to 
serve the asserted governmental interest insofar as decades of Attorney 
General investigations, multiple UBP revisions, and numerous 
stakeholder collaboratives and technical conferences have not 
remedied the problems. During the November and December 2017 
hearing, the New York Attorney General’s expert witness testified that 
her investigations over the last seventeen years were indicative of a 
broken industry, “because the complaints that we receive . . . they’re a 
similar type. They’re slamming[,] they’re promises of substantial 
savings, they’re failure to provide contracts, they’re high-pressure 
sales. And these are patterns of practices that we see.”240 Moreover, 
years of enforcement actions have not fully resolved issues in the 
market and the New York Attorney General cannot “bring 
enforcement actions against every entity that engages in these 
practices. The fact is that we have . . . multiple ongoing investigations 
into ESCO companies right now concerning the same type of 
practices.”241 Accordingly, on these facts, a court would likely find that 
a restriction on ESCOs’ marketing to residential customers would not 
violate the First Amendment. 
                                                                 
 240. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at 
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D. A Prohibition on Mass Market Service Will Not Regulate ESCOs 
out of the REV Arena 
Possible constitutional challenges aside, another common argument 
against implementing a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass market 
customers is that ESCOs are required to fulfill the potential of REV 
and increased regulations will prevent ESCOs from innovating in the 
renewable energy space. Trade associations representing the interests 
of ESCOs in policy proceedings have claimed that the instant 
proceedings are not consistent with REV and that prohibiting ESCOs 
from serving mass market customers “would undermine the role 
imagined for ESCOs in the REV proceeding and thereby upend the 
REV proceeding as a whole.”242 In response to suggestions of enacting 
a prohibition on ESCOs serving the mass market, ESCO 
representatives argue that 
regulating ESCOs out of . . . New York’s mass-market 
would eliminate an entire group of intermediaries and extend 
monopoly energy services back to the transmission grid (in 
the case of electricity) – which should not be seen as 
anything other than a retrograde movement back from 
energy delivery innovation targeting climate change in the 
United States.243  
Such claims are interesting insofar as the challenges in the ESCO 
market have long pre-dated REV and its related policy proceedings. 
As a preliminary matter, such arguments appear as a retroactive pretext 
to justify the continued operation of ESCOs in the mass market. The 
Attorney General’s Office has been investigating ESCOs’ marketing 
and business practices for over two decades, and the instant 
proceedings were commenced in 2012, two years before REV even 
existed.244 Thus, for ESCOs to now claim that REV identified 
                                                                 
 242. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Direct Testimony of Jeff Makholm on 
behalf of RESA, Case 15-M-0127, at 63 (Sept.15, 2017). 
 243. Id. at 60. 
 244. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the 
Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Case 14-M-0101 (Apr. 25, 
2014). 
402 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
numerous environmental goals “that can only be achieved efficiently 
by” them appears disingenuous at best.245 At worst, it is inaccurate. 
Admittedly, the need to regulate must be balanced against the need 
to innovate. The energy sector is New York’s largest source of GHGs, 
responsible for 86% of emissions.246 It is clear that cleaner, renewable 
sources of generation are necessary if New York wants to maintain its 
position as a leader in innovating climate change mitigation strategies. 
However, providing additional consumer protections will not regulate 
ESCOs out of the REV arena. Enacting a prohibition on ESCOs’ 
service to mass market customers except in instances where the 
ESCOs certify that 100% of the electricity they provide is sourced 
from renewable generation preserves ESCOs’ ability to participate in 
REV if they so choose. If the Commission adopts the DPS Staff’s 
proposal, not only would ESCOs be free to provide value-added 
services in the form of renewably-sourced products that assist New 
York in meeting its environmental goals, they would be required to do 
so in the absence of guaranteeing lower prices than utility service. 
Contrary to claims that increased regulation would frustrate the 
goals of REV, the DPS Staff proposal would force ESCOs to facilitate 
New York’s climate change mitigation goals present in REV.247 REV 
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is expected to “build an integrated energy network able to harness the 
combined benefits of the central grid with clean, locally generated 
power.”248 As such, REV is intended to transform how New York 
utilities operate by allowing them to (1) earn return in energy 
efficiency and distributed energy resource markets, (2) use price 
signals to encourage system efficiency, and (3) take advantage of 
technological advancements and innovation.249 REV envisions a 
market whereby private sector investment assists with transitioning the 
state to clean energy, rather than government and ratepayers bearing 
the brunt of the costs.250 
The Commission has acknowledged that that the, “[d]evelopments 
of markets in which vendors offer innovative services of value to 
consumers, and in which consumers can participate with confidence, 
is critically important to the success of the Reforming the Energy 
Vision (REV) initiative.”251 However, the Commission realizes it is 
equally true that “[r]etail energy markets focused on commodity-only 
products, and in which ESCOs do not meet expectations of many 
customers, will thwart these objectives.”252 If ESCOs are unable or 
                                                                 
energy use, supply and demand forecasts, inventory of state greenhouse gas 
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unwilling to offer products beyond the commodity-only offerings of 
utilities and cannot increase the percentage of renewable energy in the 
generation mix, then they are not currently achieving the goals of REV. 
The DPS Staff’s proposal regarding the 100% renewable energy 
option for serving mass market customers would ensure that ESCOs 
are actually working to achieve REV goals.253 One party in particular 
expressed its desire for a requirement that ESCOs be required to offer 
100% renewable energy because, although ESCOs may currently offer 
some green products, “it’s important . . . that the information about 
where those RECs [Renewable Energy Credits] are coming from is 
transparent and what percentage of that power is, in fact, green 
power.”254 Another expert witness expressed concern that based on her 
review of terms and conditions and actual renewable energy products 
being marketed to New York consumers, “too many of these offers 
reflect ESCO purchases of Renewable Energy Credits or RECs from 
jurisdictions outside New York and, as a result, will not provide any 
incremental renewable energy resources in the New York wholesale 
market.”255 
Experts believe that “[t]he changing climate should be seen as a 
series of discrete, manageable problems that can be attacked from all 
angles simultaneously. . . . Each part of the problem of climate change 
has a solution that can make our society healthier and stronger.”256 
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ESCOs certainly could be part of that solution, but only if they are 
required to offer quantifiable value-added products, such as renewable 
generation in excess of the current utility mix. To that end, adopting 
the DPS Staff’s proposal that requires ESCOs to serve mass market 
customers with either a savings guarantee below the utility price or a 
100% renewable energy product advances the goals of REV. 
Importantly, as DPS Staff members testified during the evidentiary 
hearings, “[t]here are ESCOs and utilities that provide 100%. It’s 
imminently doable.”257 
Nevertheless, the Commission might wish to consider permitting 
other tiers of renewable energy products into the mass market place as 
a means of introducing more price transparency for consumers. For 
example, it is conceivable that consumers might be interested in a 50% 
renewable product, a 75% renewable product, and a 100% renewable 
product. It is likely that such products can only be produced at a 
premium above the default utility rates, and one would expect that as 
the percentage of renewable generation increases in the product, so too 
would the price of the product. If the Commission allowed ESCOs to 
compete for mass market customers based on advertising and 
certifying tiers of renewable energy products (and publishing the price 
differences for varying renewable products), then consumers could 
make more informed choices about whether to pay more money for 
renewables or to remain with the default utility service. Therefore, 
ESCOs’ experts’ claims that ending mass market service would end 
the renewable energy industry in New York are unfounded under 
either a 100% renewable only requirement scenario or a tiered 
system.258 
Not only will additional oversight not regulate ESCOs out of the 
REV arena, but such enhanced consumer protections are vital to 
developing another energy market imagined in REV: DERs. 
Correcting abuses in the ESCO market is necessary to creating a 
thriving DER market. Throughout the evidentiary hearing, multiple 
ESCOs expressed their desire to expand by offering mass market 
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customers not only commodity services but also DER services.259 For 
example, Alan Tilley, Co-founder and Director of Power Operations 
at Drift Marketplace, Inc., which intends to operate as both an ESCO 
and a DER, opined during the hearing that “if the outcome of this 
proceeding results in a shutdown of the current mass retail market, the 
development of the new DER marketplace will be severely 
compromised.”260 ESCO expert economist Dr. Jeff Makholm similarly 
expressed the belief that “removing ESCOS from the electric and gas 
markets would significantly impair ESCOS’ ability to provide DER 
service for customers.”261 Possible DER products include a 
Community Distributed Generation (CDG) subscription, energy 
efficiency programs, battery storage, and on-site solar photovoltaic 
(PV) systems. One can easily imagine a scenario in which an ESCO 
seeks to provide commodity electricity service to a residential 
customer and also provides DER service through installation of solar 
panels and perhaps a battery storage unit. DPS Staff experts even 
admitted during the evidentiary hearings that they were “expecting that 
the ESCOs will play a significant role, especially to the extent that they 
become DER providers in the REV marketplace.”262 
Given the deception and fraudulent marketing claims that have 
occurred in the ESCO arena, it is necessary that such abuses be 
corrected so that they do not negatively impact the renewable DER 
space. Consumer protection measures are all the more necessary in the 
DER space where contracts for solar panels can last 20 years, far 
longer than an electric commodity contract that typically spans a few 
months to a year. 
Recognizing the need for safeguards and adequate consumer 
protection measures in this new space – especially since most mass 
market customers do not have extensive energy bill management 
experience – the Commission sought comments from stakeholders on 
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its proposed Uniform Business Practices for Distributed Energy 
Resource Suppliers (UBP-DERS) in April 2017.263 Specifically, the 
Commission sought comments on (1) the DPS Staff’s Supplemental 
Whitepaper addressing the Commission’s oversight of distributed 
energy resource suppliers (DERS);264 (2) the draft UBP-DERS;265 (3) 
a set of rules governing, among other things, DER suppliers’ business 
and marketing practices; and (4) the initial DER Oversight Staff 
Proposal.266 
Since the DER market is in its infancy and many customers may not 
be familiar with the technologies, it is especially important that the 
Commission implement regulatory safeguards that protect customers 
from possible deception and establish the consumer confidence 
necessary for the market to thrive. Concerns regarding deception and 
misinformation spilling over from the ESCO space to the DER space 
are not unfounded. At the June 19, 2017 Technical Conference, a 
representative from NYSERDA, when discussing the NY-Sun 
program,267 noted that Lead Generators – third-parties who market 
DER products to customers and then sell the list of interested 
customers to a particular DER supplier such as a solar company – have 
already been the source of some customer complaints.268 
Getting REV right means correcting market failures in the ESCO 
world and preventing abuses in the DER market. The Commission is 
taking steps towards achieving these important public policy goals 
with the recent issuance of its Order Establishing Oversight 
Framework and Uniform Business for Distributed Energy Resource 
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Suppliers in October 2017.269 While the UBP-DERS is an important 
first step in trying to protect the nascent DER market from some of the 
abuses occurring in the ESCO market, it is unclear at this time how the 
UBP and the UBP-DERS will apply to a single company that intends 
to act both as an ESCO and as a DER if a prohibition on ESCO service 
to mass market customers is put in place. For example, if the 
Commission adopts the DPS Staff’s proposal as written, it is unclear 
whether an ESCO providing a bundled 100% renewable commodity 
product with DER service such as solar panels could engage in door-
to-door marketing. It is also unclear which provisions would govern 
customer consent and contract renewals of such bundled services. 
Several commenters urged consolidation of the UBP for ESCOs and 
the UBP-DERS, but the Commission noted that “the complexity of the 
ongoing ESCO proceeding makes modifications to the UBP 
impractical.”270 Nevertheless, the Commission agreed with 
commenters “that a single document should ultimately be created to 
avoid confusion or unnecessary duplication”271 and directed DPS Staff 
to begin issuing a plan for combining the documents as soon as 
practicable.272 Regardless of the recommendations that the 
administrative law judges make to the Commission regarding the 
ESCO evidentiary hearing following the submission of parties’ post-
hearing briefs, the Commission must be mindful of the ambiguities that 
currently exist in the two sets of UBPs. Indeed, it would be prudent for 
the Commission to consider consolidating the UBP for ESCOs and the 
UBP-DERS immediately if it intends to allow ESCOs to continue 
serving mass market customers in any fashion. 
The importance of the ongoing ESCO proceedings cannot be 
understated. The evidentiary hearings in late 2017 elicited much 
testimony on the significance of encouraging innovation to facilitate 
REV and climate change mitigation efforts in the energy sector around 
the world. One expert opined, “[a]s energy distributors – particularly 
electric companies – face a new wave of interest in new sources of 
green and decentralized power production, New York has become a 
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magnet for international study in new energy markets as delegations 
from around the world come to meet the REV staff and study the 
initiative.”273 If REV is to be successful, it requires greater regulatory 
oversight of ESCOs and DER service providers, not less. 
E. A Note About Far-Reaching Impacts 
It should also be noted that correcting abuses in the ESCO market, 
preventing abuses in the DER market, and getting REV right would 
allow New York to not only achieve emission reductions in the energy 
sector, but also in the second largest sector that contributes to climate 
change: agriculture.274 It is no secret that energy generation and 
transmission can result in the permanent loss of agricultural lands.275 
New York State lost 600,000 acres of agricultural lands between 2001 
and 2010.276 Energy is necessary for agricultural operations and 
irrigation, as well as food preservation and transportation.277 
Moreover, methane emissions are the second largest source of New 
York’s GHG emissions (fuel combustion emissions being the 
largest).278 The primary sources of methane emissions are landfills, 
agricultural animals, and natural gas leaks from the pipes in New 
York’s transmission and distribution system.279 REV directs 
NYSERDA to “work with private partners, regulators, and 
stakeholders representing the agricultural, food processing, and source 
separated food-waste management sectors to develop and spur market 
adoption of innovative and replicable solutions, including anaerobic 
digester biogas production and use, to deliver operational and energy 
productivity gains, and additional revenue streams.”280 In addition, 
REV requires the Department of Agriculture and Markets, 
NYSERDA, and Department of Environmental Conservation to 
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“develop a comprehensive, cost-effective strategy to support in-state, 
sustainable, low-carbon fuel production using agricultural and organic 
waste feedstock, especially as a substitute for petroleum fuels imported 
from out-of-state.”281 
Harnessing the power of DERs could have significant impacts on 
the agricultural sector because anaerobic digesters are one type of DER 
being developed in the market place. Anaerobic digesters on farms, 
coupled with biogas electric generators can “market locally-sourced 
clean energy, contribute consistent, base load power to the grid, reduce 
loads on transmission and distribution equipment, and provide wasted 
heat for onsite and offsite use. In particular, excess power generated 
by farms could benefit the grid by serving local electric loads in the 
areas around these farms.”282 Anaerobic digestion on farms can not 
only reduce GHG emissions associated with manure from livestock, 
but it can also reduce GHG emissions attributable to food waste in 
landfills because these facilities can use manure blended with food 
waste.283 Farmers’ utility bills can be reduced by using anaerobic 
digestion, which can also provide an alternative income stream if 
farmers sell excess energy back to the grid.284 However, if ESCO 
market abuses continue uncorrected and spill into the DER market, the 
likelihood of anaerobic digesters appearing on farms or in 
communities in numbers large enough to make an impact on GHG 
emissions is slim.285 
                                                                 
 281. See id. at 77. 
 282. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 38. 
 283. Id.; see also NORMAN SCOTT ET AL., USING FOOD WASTES IN FARM-BASED 
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 284. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 39. 
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related proceedings, such as Case 15-E-0751 Value of Distributed Energy Resource 
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CONCLUSION 
In the 1990s, New York embarked on an experiment of epic 
proportions when it sought to restructure an industry that had 
previously been a regulated monopoly: the energy industry. Like many 
other states, New York sought to increase competition within the 
energy sector to drive down prices for consumers and expand the range 
of renewable energy options that were available. After waiting nearly 
three decades, New York appears poised to finally assess the efficacy 
of this great experiment. Years of escalating consumer complaints, 
Attorney General investigations, and analysis by the DPS Staff have 
revealed that residential consumers are not faring as well as the State 
had hoped. Since 2014, New Yorkers electing to receive energy 
commodity service from companies competing with the default 
utilities were overcharged to the tune of one billion dollars. In 
households where families struggle to make ends meet and often must 
choose between putting dinner on the table or keeping the heat on, any 
overcharge on an energy bill creates a public health hazard. More 
families than ever before must continue confronting the Hobson’s 
choice of paying the food bill or paying the energy bill when both costs 
have never been higher.286 
The status quo is not sustainable. The Commission stands poised at 
a crossroads. It can continue allowing ESCOs to serve mass market 
customers and rely on the Attorney General to investigate and enforce 
the law. However, the last two decades have shown that enforcement 
efforts alone are insufficient to yield the desired results. Alternatively, 
the Commission can prohibit ESCOs from serving mass market 
customers until ESCOs can deliver on the promises for which they 
were allowed to enter the market in the first place: lower prices, 
valuable energy products designed to lower consumers’ bills, and 
innovative services like DERs and renewable green products. The 
Commission’s primary purpose must be to protect ratepayers from 
                                                                 
 286. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at 
3,855 (Dec. 12, 2017) (according to PULP’s CPA expert witness William D. Yates, 
“[d]uring the worst winter on record in New York State, ESCOs contributed 
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potential market harms.287 Adoption of the DPS Staff proposal – with 
the additional modifications discussed above – establishes a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme that both protects consumers and 
promotes fair competition in the ESCO market and the emerging DER 
market. 
Adoption of the DPS Staff proposal will implement proper 
consumer protections while fulfilling the promise of REV and 
ensuring New York is successful in its climate change leadership 
efforts. The ESCO market is a cautionary tale. If similar abuses also 
proliferate in the nascent DER market, it will be difficult to inspire the 
consumer confidence necessary for that market to thrive or for other 
renewable energy efforts to succeed. Regulatory intervention is 
appropriate where, as here, the industry to be regulated “is of such 
significance to every aspect of the economy and to life itself that the 
State does not have the luxury of leisurely waiting for the market to 
correct itself.”288 The spotlight is on and the evidence is in: New York 
consumers deserve better. The Commission’s time to act is now. 
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